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Reliance in Land Use Law 
Kenneth A. Stahl* 
ABSTRACT 
For generations, Americans have tapped their life savings and assumed 
huge amounts of debt in order to achieve the American dream of owning their 
own home. Though investing so heavily in a single asset is a rather risky move 
on its face, buyers have been induced to purchase homes by a slew of public 
policies, most notably zoning ordinances that buffer single-family 
neighborhoods against an invasion of unwanted uses. As a result, homeowners 
have a fairly convincing argument that they possess some sort of vested reliance 
interest in the existing zoning of their neighborhoods that should prevent 
municipal authorities from enacting unwanted zoning changes. 
Courts, however, have not been receptive to homeowners’ pleas when such 
zoning changes are threatened. While courts will frequently safeguard the 
reliance interests of landowners who have undertaken substantial expenditures 
to develop their property, they offer no such protection for the reliance interests 
of landowners who desire to prevent development on neighboring property. I 
argue that the distinction between developers’ and neighbors’ reliance interests 
rests on judicial intuitions about the nature of the local political process: courts 
suspect that homeowners are likely to be the dominant faction in most 
municipalities and can therefore prevent unwanted development through their 
influence with city hall, whereas developers are unlikely to be powerful in a 
local political process dominated by antidevelopment homeowners, especially 
once a developer has made substantial expenditures on a particular project. 
This conclusion leads to a broader insight: judicial review of land use decision 
making is largely driven by a desire to protect the reliance interests of both 
developers and homeowners. Thus, courts are generally deferential toward most 
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Property & Society Annual Meeting. Special thanks to Erik Beck and Kevin Grochow for 
outstanding research assistance. 
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municipal land use policies that privilege homeowners’ reliance interests but 
occasionally temper that deference with solicitude for developers. 
The courts’ fetishization of reliance interests has come at a substantial 
price, however. For the sake of protecting reliance interests in existing zoning 
schemes, courts have essentially reified a longstanding pattern of de facto 
income and racial segregation in most metropolitan regions by licensing 
suburban communities to maintain zoning barriers that enforce such 
segregation. Moreover, I conclude that the judicial enterprise to protect reliance 
interests by empowering local governments is entirely self-defeating because, as 
the recent real estate downturn vividly illustrates, property values are 
determined by a complex web of forces well beyond the control of local 
governments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A recent survey by the real estate valuation website Zillow 
reveals that, although home prices have sharply declined since the 
economic crash of 2008, home sellers routinely overstate the value of 
their homes by 10% or more.1 Another survey, by the consulting 
group The Saint Index, measured attitudes toward real estate 
development and found that homeowners are more hostile to new 
development now than they have ever been in the six-year history of 
the survey.2 The Saint Index survey further concluded that concern 
about the impact of new development on home values was a 
significant factor in explaining this hostility.3 Taken together, these 
two studies demonstrate that homeowners are grimly determined to 
cling to a state of affairs that has since been wiped out by the 
economic calamity. They can hardly be faulted for their 
stubbornness. Millions of Americans have invested all or virtually all 
of their savings in the family home.4 To finance the purchase of that 
 
 1. See Sellers Who Bought Post-Bubble Guilty of Overpricing Homes, ZILLOW.COM (July 14, 
2011), http://zillow.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=159&item=231. For further commentary, 
see Kenneth R. Harney, Bridging the Great Divide Between Home Buyers and Sellers, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 
1, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/business/realestate/la-fi-harney-20120101,0,6342117.story.  
 2. See The Saint Consulting Group, General Attitudes, THE SAINT INDEX, 
http://saintindex.info/general-attitudes#nimbyattitudes (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).  
 3. See The Saint Consulting Group, Activism, THE SAINT INDEX, 
http://saintindex.info/activism (last visited Sept. 7, 2013). According to the survey authors, 
while only 14% of respondents answered that protecting the value of their homes was the 
principal reason for their opposition to new development, six years of survey results 
demonstrates that protecting home values plays a much larger role in opposition to 
development. See id. 
 4. See William A. Fischel, Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144, 146 (2001) 
[hereinafter Fischel, NIMBYs] (reporting that a vast majority of households have all of their 
savings in their homes). 
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home, most buyers have assumed an indebtedness so substantial 
that they can expect to spend nearly the rest of their lives paying it 
back.5 A major decline in the value of one’s home can wipe out the 
homeowner’s savings and jeopardize her ability to obtain further 
credit, while leaving the underlying debt firmly intact.6 
Homeowners thus have a very good reason to hope that their 
property values will not decline after the initial purchase. But 
millions of Americans have not invested their savings and 
creditworthiness in a single asset of uncertain value by simply 
crossing their fingers and hoping for the best. Rather, it has been a 
principal aim of government housing policy for nearly the past 
century to encourage home purchases by assuring buyers that the 
value of their homes will be maintained. Policies such as cheap low-
interest mortgages, generous tax deductions, and municipal zoning 
ordinances have all been designed to induce Americans to buy 
homes by giving them the confidence that their investments will not 
decline in value.7 After being plied with such assurances, it is 
understandable that homeowners would not be keen on seeing their 
property values plummet. Needless to say, homeowners become 
especially infuriated when the very government policies upon which 
they have relied in choosing to purchase their homes are changed in 
such a way that threatens to cause a decline in property values. As 
countless anecdotes reveal, homeowners who have purchased homes 
in a neighborhood zoned exclusively for single-family homes will 
revolt at the prospect of municipal authorities changing the 
neighborhood’s zoning classification to permit a new development 
such as a shopping mall or a multi-family housing complex.8 Having 
purchased in reliance on the pre-existing zoning classification, 
 
 5. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.1 (5th ed. 
2007) (describing a typical 30-year, fully amortizing mortgage).  
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 32–33 (describing consequences of decline in 
property values). 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 35–49 (describing government housing policies). 
 8. For discussions of various episodes in which homeowners (often dubbed “NIMBYs”) 
have fought tooth and nail against proposed new development, see, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF 
QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 153–219 (1990); RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL 
OF PUBLIC MAN 301–08 (1977) (discussing a variety of tactics used by the neighborhood of Forest 
Hills, Queens, to prevent siting of low-income housing project); Michael Dear, Understanding and 
Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome, 58 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 288, 290–91 (1992) (describing 
strategies used by development opponents to prevent unwanted growth). 
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homeowners often believe they have a vested right to maintain that 
classification in perpetuity.9 As with most things, this belief 
frequently ends up the subject of litigation. 
The courts have indeed been hospitable venues for claims that a 
particular landowner has a cognizable reliance interest in a 
regulatory status quo. Since the 1920s, the courts have used numerous 
doctrines, such as nonconforming use, vested rights, zoning 
estoppel, and the “distinct investment-backed expectations” prong of 
the regulatory takings inquiry, to protect landowners in 
circumstances where they have been induced to make expenditures 
in the good-faith belief that the existing regulatory state of affairs 
would remain in place.10 These doctrines, however, have proven to 
be of little help to homeowners aggrieved by land use changes. 
Courts will typically only protect a landowner’s reliance interests 
when he or she has done something more than finance a purchase of 
real estate under an existing regulatory regime, such as making 
costly improvements to the property. In short, the courts are more 
concerned about protecting the reliance interests of developers of real 
property than the reliance interests of neighboring landowners who 
wish merely to prevent the development of nearby property.11 The 
courts typically rationalize their solicitude for developers on two 
grounds: 1) fairness to those who have made expenditures in good 
faith reliance on the status quo and 2) the desire to incentivize 
investment in real property. As I explain further below, however,  
 
 
 
 9. See Ken Baar, Facts and Fallacies in the Rental Housing Market, W. CITY, Sept. 1986, at 
57 (“One of the most cherished property rights in our ‘free enterprise system’ is not the right to 
do what one pleases with one’s property, but the right to live in a neighborhood in which no 
more multi-family housing may be constructed.”). 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 15–17 (summarizing extant doctrine). 
 11. The tension between landowners who wish to develop their property and landowners 
who would prevent development on neighboring property has been the subject of an extensive 
literature. Fischel, for example, details the dynamic between “land at risk” and “land at rest.” See 
Fischel, NIMBYS, supra note 4, at 253, 278–80 (citing JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE 
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 24 (1956)). Others refer 
to a conflict between “use” and “exchange” value. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. 
MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 31–49 (1987) (describing 
conflict between those who desire to maximize exchange value and those who desire to 
maximize use value, and how it is manifested in political terms in urban governance); MANUEL 
CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS 319 (1983).  
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both of these justifications would likewise favor the judicial 
protection of homeowners’ reliance interests.12 
This Article develops a model for explaining why courts treat 
developers’ reliance interests so much more favorably than those of 
homeowners, notwithstanding the fact that homeowners seem to 
have a strong case for judicial protection of their reliance interests. 
Drawing on public choice scholarship—which urges that judicial 
doctrine should be sensitive to the nature of the political process by 
which legislation is enacted13—I argue that the principal reason 
courts decline to provide protection for homeowners’ reliance 
interests is because they suspect, correctly, that homeowners have 
sufficient political influence with the regulatory authorities that 
make most land use decisions to protect their own reliance interests 
through the political process without judicial intervention (by, for 
example, pressuring the local city council to enact and maintain 
zoning ordinances that restrict unwanted new development). Thus, 
contrary to initial appearances, courts are not indifferent to 
homeowners’ reliance interests; they simply believe that those 
interests are more appropriately vindicated within the political than 
the judicial sphere. In fact, as I demonstrate, courts have taken 
affirmative steps to ensure that homeowners have the ability to 
protect their own reliance interests through the political process, 
such as deferring broadly to municipal land use ordinances designed 
to protect homeowners’ existing property values and endorsing the 
proliferation of small suburban municipalities in which homeowners 
can reliably exercise political control. 
By the same token, however, because the local political process 
tends to advantage antidevelopment homeowners, courts intuit that 
developers are systematically underrepresented in that process. 
Thus, judicial protection is necessary to protect developers in 
circumstances where they are likely to be exploited by a hostile local 
majority. According to public choice theory, developers can typically 
avoid such exploitation by simply exiting the jurisdiction and 
seeking a friendlier regulatory environment elsewhere. Once a 
 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 50–53. 
 13. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 12–37, 
116–43 (1991); MAXWELL STEARNS & TODD ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 42–92 (2009). 
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developer makes a substantial investment in a particular project, 
however, the cost of exit rises dramatically and renders the developer 
vulnerable to majoritarian exploitation. For this reason, judicial 
intervention into the political process is appropriate where a 
developer has presented evidence of significant reliance interests. 
This public choice model thus yields an important insight: 
judicial review of land use decision making is largely driven by the 
desire to protect reliance interests—both those of developers and 
homeowners. This solicitude for reliance interests equally explains 
why courts are generally deferential toward most municipal land use 
policies that favor homeowners and why they occasionally temper 
that deference in order to protect developers’ reliance interests. 
Previous public choice scholarship on land use decision making has 
not trained its focus on the importance of reliance, and some 
scholars have affirmatively dismissed the significance of reliance.14 
This paper argues, though, that reliance belongs at the heart of the 
public choice model of judicial review. 
Recognizing the primacy of reliance is important because it 
enables a robust normative critique of the judicial approach to 
municipal land use decision making. For the sake of protecting 
reliance interests in existing zoning schemes, courts have essentially 
 
 14. Saul Levmore argues that public choice theory can explain the Supreme Court’s 
regulatory takings doctrine insofar as that doctrine extends protection to smaller, isolated 
groups that are incapable of organizing to influence government, but typically denies protection 
to larger, well-organized groups. See Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. 
L. REV. 285, 320 (1990). Levmore explicitly rejects the idea that the Court’s takings 
jurisprudence centers on the protection of reliance interests. See id. at 317–18 n.74. I respond to 
Levmore’s argument infra at text accompanying notes 86–89, 159–80. 
In a pair of books, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001) [hereinafter FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER 
HYPOTHESIS] and REGULATORY TAKINGS (1995) [hereinafter FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS], 
William Fischel has argued that homeowners control the local political process, that developers 
are therefore vulnerable to exploitation by that process, and that courts should accordingly 
intervene to protect developers from majoritarian exploitation. While noting the role that risk 
plays in the homeowner’s motivation to be politically active, Fischel does not draw attention to 
the significance of reliance interests in establishing the relative political influence of 
homeowners vis-à-vis developers, or the ways in which the courts have sought to protect the 
reliance interests of both homeowners and developers.  
Finally, Joseph William Singer’s landmark article, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 611 (1988), argues that the law of property does in fact, and should as a normative 
matter, recognize that non-owners of property often have vested reliance interests in the use of 
real property owned by others. Singer’s article spends little time discussing land use regulation, 
or how public choice theory specifically can justify robust protection for reliance interests.  
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reified a longstanding pattern of income and racial segregation in 
most metropolitan regions by licensing suburban communities to 
maintain zoning barriers that enforce such segregation. Courts have 
been clear that the protection of reliance interests is a perfectly 
sensible justification for discriminating in favor of existing residents 
and against prospective residents. The courts dismiss concerns about 
interlocal segregation by simply insisting that a municipality’s land 
use policies have no impacts beyond its borders. 
This last point is revealing because it demonstrates the very 
flimsy footing on which the entire reliance model of judicial review 
rests. The model presupposes that homeowners can protect their 
own reliance interests through their influence over local government, 
and therefore assumes that those reliance interests will not be 
adversely affected by actions taking place outside the municipality 
(over which homeowners would have no control). In truth, however, 
property values are determined by a complex web of forces well 
beyond the control of isolated local governments, as the recent real 
estate crash forcefully demonstrates. I conclude, therefore, that 
municipalities’ charge to protect homeowners’ reliance interests is a 
self-defeating enterprise, and unworthy of the judicial deference it 
has been granted. 
Part I sets out the basic problem: courts appear to favor 
developers’ reliance interests and disfavor homeowners’ reliance 
interests, although homeowners have a strong case that their 
reliance interests are deserving of judicial protection. Part II 
considers and dismisses some superficially appealing explanations 
for this distinction. Part III sets out the basic public choice model of 
reliance and shows how that model can explain both judicial 
deference to land use policies that favor homeowners and judicial 
intervention to protect developers’ reliance interests. Part IV then 
articulates a descriptive and normative critique of the model. 
I. WHOSE RELIANCE INTERESTS COUNT? 
This Part illustrates an apparent inconsistency in land use law: 
courts provide protection for the reliance interests of landowners 
who wish to develop their property, at least in some circumstances, 
but no such protection for the reliance interests of landowners who 
wish to prevent development on neighboring property. Section A sets 
out the basic law governing the judicial protection of reliance 
interests in land use law and explains how it distinguishes 
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developers from neighbors. Section B then argues that this 
distinction is, on the surface, indefensible: neighbors have at least as 
strong an argument for judicial recognition of their reliance interests 
as developers do. In the subsequent Parts, I will articulate a model of 
judicial review that explains why courts extend judicial protection for 
developers’ reliance interests while denying it to neighbors. 
A. Judicial Protection for Reliance Interests in Land Use Law 
As is true in many other areas of the law, one persistent theme 
in land use law is the desire to vindicate the expectations of those 
who have taken substantial actions to their detriment in reasonable 
reliance on the status quo. Courts have fashioned a number of 
common-law doctrines designed to protect landowners who have 
reasonably relied on an existing scheme of land use regulations 
against an adverse change in that regulatory scheme. For instance, if 
a landowner has been using her property in a manner consistent 
with existing zoning regulations and the zoning is then changed to 
make that use of land unlawful, the landowner may be entitled to 
continue using the land as she did prior to the zoning change under 
the doctrine of “nonconforming use.”15 Likewise, if a landowner has 
made substantial expenditures on an inchoate development project 
under a regulatory regime, the developer may acquire “vested rights” 
that prevent the regulatory authority from changing its regulations in 
a manner that interferes with the developer’s expectations.16 Finally, 
the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings doctrine provides that one 
touchstone for determining whether a landowner’s property has 
been “taken” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment is the 
extent to which regulation upsets a landowner’s “distinct  
 
 
 
 15. See, e.g., JAMES C. SMITH & JACQUELINE P. HAND, NEIGHBORING PROPERTY OWNERS § 8:8 
(2011) (describing nonconforming use doctrine). In most states, nonconforming uses can be 
amortized after a reasonable period of time. See DANIEL P. SELMI ET AL., LAND USE REGULATION 
67–69 (3d ed. 2008) (collecting cases). In a minority of states, however, amortization is per se 
unconstitutional. See id. (collecting cases). 
 16. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. ZIZKA ET AL., STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE LIABILITY 
§ 2:11 (2011) (describing vested rights doctrine). A related doctrine to vested rights is “zoning 
estoppel.” Zoning estoppel generally refers to a situation where a developer makes substantial 
investments in reliance on a representation by a government official. See SELMI ET AL., supra note 
15, at 135 (collecting cases finding estoppel). 
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investment-backed expectations,” that is, the landowner’s reasonable 
reliance on a pre-existing state of affairs.17 
Although courts have done a poor job articulating precisely why 
reliance interests deserve judicial protection, it appears that the 
respect accorded to reliance interests is rooted in considerations of 
both equity and efficiency. First, courts seem to think it fundamentally 
unfair that a landowner should expend significant resources on an 
investment in the good faith belief that the status quo would remain 
unchanged, only to endure a complete wipeout of that investment 
when an unpredictable change occurs.18 Second, protecting reliance 
interests encourages landowners to invest resources in real property 
by giving them some assurance that they will have the eventual 
opportunity to harvest the fruits of their labor.19 If the law provided 
no protection for reliance interests, landowners would be hesitant to 
invest in real property out of fear that their investment could be 
rendered worthless at the whim of a municipal zoning authority. 
Courts, however, only offer protection to reliance interests in 
limited circumstances, perhaps out of deference to regulatory 
 
 17. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). In 
practice, the “distinct investment-backed expectations” test has proven to be more of a shield for 
government than protection for landowners because its “positivist” conception of property rights 
enables regulatory authorities to themselves determine the extent of the developer’s reasonable 
expectations. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Fall of “Investment-Backed Expectations,” 32 
URB. LAW. 437 (2000). On the other hand, the Court did invoke the idea of investment-backed 
expectations in finding a regulatory taking in one of its more significant recent cases. See Lucas 
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.7, 1019 n.8 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993) 
(arguing that the “expectations” prong of Penn Central was key to the result in Lucas). I discuss 
Lucas further infra at text accompanying notes 54–75. 
 18. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 635 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(arguing that “distinct investment backed expectations” prong of regulatory takings test is 
rooted in fairness concerns); City of Goleta v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara Cnty., 147 P.3d 
1037 (Cal. 2006) (doctrine of equitable estoppel is “founded on concepts of equity and fair 
dealing”) (citation omitted); Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use 
Regulation, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1266–67 (2009) (discussing fairness rationale).  
 19. W. Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 395 (Utah 1980) (recognizing 
vested rights and noting “[t]he economic waste that occurs when a project is halted after 
substantial costs have been incurred in its commencement”); Serkin, supra note 18, at 1270–71 
(discussing efficiency concerns); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and 
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 
269 (1988) (“In a world lacking any compensation requirement, the obvious fear is that private 
investors will be inhibited by the thought that government will snatch . . . the fruits of their 
venture.”).  
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authorities’ need for flexibility in adapting land use regulations to 
changing circumstances.20 Thus, courts will generally recognize 
vested rights only where a landowner has made substantial 
improvements to the property21 based on some very particularized 
regulatory activity, such as an application for a building permit or a 
site-specific rezoning.22 Merely financing a purchase of real property 
under an existing zoning classification is generally insufficient.23 
In practice, these requirements favor landowners who have taken 
steps to develop their property and disfavor those landowners who 
desire to prevent development on neighboring property.24 I illustrate 
 
 20. See, e.g., Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg’l Comm’n, 553 P.2d 546, 54 
(Cal. 1976) (rejecting claim that developer acquired vested rights after obtaining final 
discretionary approval because recognizing vested rights would impair “government’s right to 
control land use policy” by “freez[ing] the zoning laws applicable to a subdivision or a planned 
unit development as of the time these events occurred”). 
 21. Many courts require some evidence of construction and do not recognize pre-
construction activities as sufficient. See, e.g., DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 
124 (2d Cir. 1998) (requiring substantial construction and substantial expenditures); W. Land 
Equities, 617 P.2d at 392 (noting that most courts typically require “some physical construction” 
and will not consider “[p]reconstruction activities such as the execution of architectural 
drawings or the clearing of land and widening of roads”); J. David Breemer, Playing the 
Expectations Game: When Are Investment-Backed Land Use Expectations (Un)Reasonable in State 
Courts?, 38 URB. LAW. 81, 98–101 (2006) (describing “get a shovel in the ground” rule used by 
many state courts to evaluate whether a landowner has reasonable investment-backed 
expectations under regulatory takings inquiry).  
 22. Many states require the issuance of a permit in order for rights to vest. See Avco, 553 
P.2d at 553 (stating that vested rights require substantial expenditures in reliance on a 
government permit). Avco represents the strictest approach to vested rights. Other courts 
require only the submission of an application for development approval. See W. Land Equities, 
617 P.2d at 388 (holding developer established vested rights upon submitting application for 
subdivision approval, despite failure to move beyond stage of pre-construction planning). Still 
others will base vested rights on a site-specific rezoning. See City of Suffolk ex rel. Herbert v. Bd. 
of Zoning Appeals, 580 S.E.2d 796 (Va. 2003), rev’d by statute on other grounds (stating that vested 
rights accrued based on earlier rezoning, absent permit or application). For a comprehensive 
discussion of the various approaches, see ZIZKA ET AL., supra note 16, at § 2:11. 
 23. See, e.g., Belvidere Twp. v. Heinze, 615 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (stating 
that purchase and acquisition of financing, coupled with numerous other preparatory acts, 
deemed insufficient to establish vested rights).  
 24. This is not to say that developers are necessarily pleased with the amount of 
protection the extant doctrine affords them. The requirements for establishing vested rights are 
daunting for any developer to satisfy, and some commentators have concluded that the common-
law vested rights regime provides far too little protection for developers. See Donald G. Hagman, 
Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land Use Permits, 11 SW. U. L. REV. 545 (1979). As a result 
of pressure from developers, many states have enacted statutes providing additional protections 
for vested rights beyond those granted by the courts. See STEWART E. STERK & EDUARDO M. 
PENALVER, LAND USE REGULATION 157 (2011) (at least eighteen states have enacted vested rights 
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this problem with two examples. First, assume a developer desires to 
construct a commercial development on a parcel of land. She spends 
a total of $500,000 to acquire the parcel of land, obtain a rezoning of 
the land from single-family residential to commercial (so that 
commercial uses are now permitted), and begin construction of the 
development. This developer could, depending on the state, obtain 
vested rights that would prevent the municipality from changing the 
zoning so as to prevent commercial development. Now consider the 
second, converse scenario. An individual purchases a home for the 
same $500,000 in a neighborhood zoned exclusively for single-family 
homes, financed with a hefty mortgage. If the municipality 
subsequently changes the neighborhood’s zoning classification to 
permit commercial uses, the homeowner would have no vested 
rights—in any state—that could block the land use change, even if 
the homeowner could plausibly claim that she relied upon the pre-
existing zoning classification in choosing to purchase her home in 
this neighborhood. The law distinguishes between the developer and 
the homeowner because 1) the developer has undertaken substantial 
improvements based on the pre-existing regulatory state of affairs 
whereas the homeowner has not (her claim is simply that she 
purchased her property and obtained financing in reliance on the 
pre-existing zoning); and 2) the developer obtained some site-
specific regulatory assurance (a rezoning of the parcel) whereas the 
homeowner did not (she seeks to maintain the zoning classification 
not only on her own property, but on an entire neighborhood). 
Hence, several courts have specifically held that neighbors have no 
“eternally vested rights” in the perpetuation of an existing zoning 
classification.25 
 
statutes). On the other hand, it is fair to question why courts should recognize developers’ 
vested rights at all. Protecting vested rights may overly constrain a municipality’s ability to 
change its land use regulations in response to changed circumstances, and may also encourage 
inefficient investment in land by developers for the sake of obtaining vested rights. See Serkin, 
supra note 18, at 1283–87. I explore further infra at text accompanying notes 71–73 the reasons 
why courts have not provided more robust protection for developers’ vested rights. 
 25. See Rodgers v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. 1951); see also, e.g., Grund 
v. Jefferson Cnty., 277 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1973); Spiker v. City of Lakewood, 603 P.2d 130, 133 
(Colo. 1979) (stating that neighbors have no “vested right, per se, in the maintenance of a 
particular zoning classification”); McGee v. City of Cocoa, 168 So. 2d 766, 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1964) (“[V]ested rights in a particular zoning ordinance do not accrue to neighboring 
owners”); Norbeck Vill. Joint Venture v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 254 A.2d 700 (Md. 1969); 
Navin v. Town of Exeter, 339 A.2d 12 (N.H. 1975); Gray v. Trs., Monclova Twp., 313 N.E.2d 
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At first blush, it makes sense that the law does not protect 
neighbors’ reliance interests. It seems ludicrous to think that a 
landowner could have vested rights in how a neighboring landowner 
uses her own property. If we look closely at the homeowner’s 
reliance claim, however, we will see that the matter is far more 
complex. In fact, there is a strong argument that, judged by either 
the criterion of fairness or efficiency, homeowners often have 
reliance interests in existing zoning classifications that are just as  
compelling, if not more so, than the reliance interests of those 
developers to whom the law offers its protection. 
 
366 (Ohio 1974); Buhler v. Racine Cnty., 146 N.W.2d 403, 408 (Wis. 1966). 
Illinois appears to be the lone state that will, in certain circumstances, recognize 
neighbors’ vested rights in a zoning scheme. See Cosmopolitan Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. City of Chi., 
190 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ill. 1963) (“[I]t is a well-established principle that one who buys land has 
a right to rely upon the classification which existed at the time the purchase was made . . . .”). 
As Fred Bosselman details in a fascinating article, Illinois’s land use jurisprudence, which 
emerged from a desire to stabilize property values and encourage investment in real estate 
during Chicago’s chaotic development of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
features some unique protections for neighbors. See Fred P. Bosselman, The Commodification of 
“Nature’s Metropolis”: The Historical Context of Illinois’ Unique Zoning Standards, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
527 (1991). 
To say that neighbors have no common-law right, outside of Illinois, to maintain an 
existing zoning classification is not to say they have no legal recourse in the event of an 
undesired zoning change. Neighbors may, for example, be able to bring suit against a 
municipality for “spot zoning” when the municipality zones a small area of land in a way that is 
inconsistent with the zoning of the surrounding area. See SELMI ET AL., supra note 15, at 69–76 
(discussing spot zoning). There are several inadequacies with a spot zoning lawsuit, however, 
including: 1) Many states limit standing to bring such suits to individuals who have suffered 
“special damages” beyond the damage suffered generally by other members of the public; 2) the 
spot zoning inquiry is very vague, depending on whether a court thinks the area rezoned is 
sufficiently small to warrant invalidation; 3) spot zoning challenges can easily be circumvented 
by simply rezoning a larger swath of land; 4) many courts will uphold spot zoning so long as it is 
otherwise reasonable; and 5) collective action problems will often prevent neighbors from 
bringing suit to challenge spot zoning. For a discussion of some of these shortcomings, see id. 
In some states, such as California, neighbors can also attempt to stymy unwanted 
development by bringing suit under statutes requiring developers to prepare detailed 
environmental impact reports explaining the potential impacts of a project and exploring 
alternatives. My goal here, though, is to understand why the judiciary distinguishes developers’ 
and homeowners’ reliance interests, so I have focused on common-law rights that landowners 
may have to attack zoning changes, not statutory rights. 
Incidentally, neither the spot zoning doctrine nor environmental impact reporting statutes 
provides a cause of action based solely on a plaintiff’s reliance interests or diminution in 
property values. These factors may give neighbors standing to sue, but do not entitle them to 
relief on the merits unless they can prove that some independent harm has been done.  
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B. The Neighbor’s Case 
1. Capitalization and reliance interests 
Let us return to our hypothetical purchaser of the $500,000 
home in a neighborhood zoned for single-family homes. What 
exactly is this individual buying for $500,000? The answer may seem 
obvious: a house. In reality, however, she is purchasing a good deal 
more than just a house for $500,000. The purchase of a home comes 
bundled with numerous other amenities, such as the local public 
schools, the property tax burden, and the character of the 
surrounding neighborhood. Economic studies demonstrate that 
these amenities are “capitalized” into home values—high-quality 
local schools, low property taxes, or a preponderance of neighbors 
who are homeowners rather than renters have been shown to 
significantly increase home values, for example.26 Perhaps the most 
important amenity that is capitalized into home values, however, is 
the neighborhood’s zoning classification.27 In essence, zoning 
provides an assurance that all of the parcels in a neighborhood will 
remain restricted to single-family usage, and the home buyer pays a 
premium for this assurance. Without the zoning, which is to say 
without this assurance against adverse change, our $500,000 home 
would undoubtedly be valued at far less. 
The reason the homeowner values this assurance so highly is 
because, absent zoning, a home purchase is a risky investment. Since 
few individuals can finance a $500,000 purchase with cash on hand, 
the homeowner will most likely pay a down payment of 10% of the 
purchase price (here, $50,000) and finance the rest with a mortgage, 
which is simply a loan that is secured by the home purchaser’s 
interest in the property.28 For most purchasers, a down payment of 
 
 26. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 45–46 (describing studies 
detailing the extent of capitalization phenomenon). According to Fischel, impacts such as traffic 
congestion, high crime rates, large public housing projects, and localized air pollution have been 
shown to decrease property values for nearby property owners, while growth controls, high-
quality local schools, and having homeowners rather than renters as neighbors have 
demonstrably increased property values. See id. 
 27. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 218–52 (using case study of 
growth controls in California to demonstrate that land use regulations are capitalized into land 
values). 
 28. For a depiction of the real estate financing process, see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra 
note 5, § 1.1.  
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$50,000 alone would be sufficient to require a substantial share of 
one’s life savings. This now becomes the homeowner’s “equity” in 
the property.29 After making the initial down payment to the seller, 
the homeowner will typically be required to make a substantial 
payment of principal and interest on the mortgage to the lender 
every month for a period of up to thirty years.30 Any payments on 
the principal are added to the homeowner’s equity. In addition to the 
mortgage, the homeowner must also pay regular property taxes, and 
may also pay homeowners’ association dues or other types of special 
taxes or assessments, which are not tax deductible. 
Provided that the value of the home remains at or above its 
initial $500,000 assessed value, the homeowner can still hope to 
cash out this equity upon a sale of the property. This is important 
because for most homeowners, the equity in their homes is the most 
significant savings—often the only savings—they possess.31 If the 
value decreases, however, the homeowner will begin to lose equity. 
The more the value of the home falls, the more equity the 
homeowner loses. If the home’s value drops to the point that the 
homeowner’s equity is wiped out, the homeowner is “underwater”—
she owes more on the property than the home is worth.32 The 
homeowner is now in the untenable position of either continuing to 
pay a large mortgage on an asset of depreciated value in which she 
has no equity, or walking away from a home into which she has 
already invested a substantial amount. The latter course may seem 
more appealing, but will surely result in a diminished credit rating 
and perhaps also a deficiency judgment by the lender to recover the 
amount still owed from whatever other assets the homeowner 
possesses.33 For all of these reasons, home buyers are very keen to 
 
 29. See id. § 1.4 (describing concept of equity). 
 30. For an example of a typical 30-year, fully amortizing mortgage, see id. § 1.1. 
 31. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 4 (providing data showing that 
for most homeowners, “the equity in their homes is the most important savings they have”). 
 32. See Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social 
Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971 (2010).  
 33. See id. at 983–86 (explaining consequences of “walking away” from an underwater 
mortgage). White argues that these consequences are not very significant by comparison to the 
benefits of shedding a severely underwater mortgage. He may be right that walking away is a 
better option than continuing to pay down an underwater mortgage, but the point here is that 
both options are bad from the perspective of a homeowner who has invested her life savings into 
her home. 
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ensure that the value of their property does not decline from the date 
of purchase. 
This, ultimately, is why zoning is such an important factor in an 
individual’s decision to purchase a home. Given the size of the 
investment and the stakes for the homeowner if property values 
diminish, a prospective purchaser needs the assurance that property 
values will not diminish as a condition of making this investment. In 
the event, therefore, that the regulatory authority chooses to alter 
the zoning in the neighborhood so as to permit more intense uses, 
the homeowner loses the protection against unwanted change that 
induced her to purchase the home at a premium price initially, and 
the value of the property will very likely decline. As it does so, it may 
trigger the parade of horribles canvassed above. 
The foregoing explains why many homeowners think they have a 
protected reliance interest in the zoning of their property. A 
disinterested observer might wonder, though, whether it is reasonable 
for a homeowner to invest such enormous resources in a single asset 
under the expectation that the zoning will never change. After all, 
zoning ordinances usually have built-in mechanisms to facilitate 
change, such as variances, special use permits, and rezonings.34 
Homeowners are presumptively aware of these mechanisms before 
they purchase their homes, and zoning’s susceptibility to change is 
presumably also capitalized into property values. The law, of course, 
only provides protection for reasonable expectations, so this may 
explain why courts do not recognize neighbors’ vested rights claims. 
2. The federal government’s role in inducing reliance 
If purchasing a home in reliance on pre-existing zoning were 
unreasonable, however, then it must be asked why millions of 
Americans have been doing just that for the past century. Home 
ownership in this country skyrocketed after zoning was widely 
adopted in the early twentieth century, and policymakers, historians, 
and economists have all concluded that zoning was a major factor in 
sparking the home ownership craze.35 Indeed, it has long been 
 
 34. See, e.g., SELMI ET AL., supra note 15, at 69–106 (discussing various mechanisms 
municipalities use to exercise flexibility in the land use approval process). 
 35. In the years between 1922 and 1929, “new homes were begun at the rate of 883,000 
per year, a pace more than double that of any previous seven-year period.” KENNETH JACKSON, 
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 175 (1985). Peter Hall 
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public policy at the national level to induce Americans to incur 
massive amounts of debt to purchase homes by providing them with 
the assurance that their investment would be protected against 
unpredictable declines in value. Two principal tools have been used 
to accomplish this goal: zoning and mortgage lending policy. To start 
with the first, zoning was initially adopted during an age of rapid 
urbanization and industrialization, which entailed the increasing 
introduction of intense industrial uses in close proximity to more 
delicate commercial and residential neighborhoods.36 This caused 
property values to become extremely unstable as potential investors 
could not reliably predict the future of areas in which they chose to 
invest.37 City leaders in the early twentieth century quickly turned to 
zoning as a solution to this problem; as one early zoning advocate 
put it, zoning would provide “greater safety and security in 
investment”38 by stabilizing property values against unpredictable 
change. Secretary of Commerce (later President) Herbert Hoover saw 
zoning specifically as a means of facilitating homeownership, which 
he believed would be the foundation of a prosperous society.39 
Hoover spearheaded a very successful movement to encourage 
municipalities nationwide to adopt comprehensive zoning 
ordinances.40 Shortly thereafter, in the famous case of Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,41 the Supreme Court placed its 
imprimatur on zoning, which the Court saw as an effective 
mechanism for protecting single-family residential neighborhoods 
 
identifies zoning along with federal government-guaranteed mortgages, new highways, and the 
baby boom as key factors in the post-World War II suburban homeownership boom. See PETER 
HALL, CITIES OF TOMORROW 316–22 (3d ed. 2002). 
 36. See generally SEYMOUR TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 35–116 (1969) (describing early origins 
of zoning).  
 37. See Bosselman, supra note 25, at 567–72 (describing how uncertainty over property 
values led to early zoning ordinances in turn-of-the-century Chicago).  
 38. See HALL, supra note 35, at 317–18 (quoting New York City Commission on Building 
Heights); see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II – Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM L. 
REV. 346, 367 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part II] (“By precluding undesirable 
changes in land use and providing a firm basis for predicting the future physical and social 
evolution of the community, zoning reduced the risks to investors in urban real estate.”). 
 39. See Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization and the 
Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1193, 1256–63 (2008). 
 40. The keystone of this effort was the adoption in 1922 of the Standard State Zoning 
Enabling Act (SSZEA). See id. 
 41. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2014 10:26 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
966 
against invasion by more intense uses.42 Home ownership and the 
municipal adoption of zoning ordinances soared in the years after 
Hoover’s efforts and the Euclid decision.43 
In the 1930s, policymakers began to encourage home purchases 
in another way: they created federal housing agencies such as the 
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) and later the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA), which were empowered to insure or 
guarantee privately issued home loans so that lenders would liberally 
offer low-interest, long-term loans with low down payments to a 
broad class of consumers.44 The U.S. Government made mortgages 
even more attractive by offering a generous income tax deduction for 
mortgage interest payments.45 These policies effectively made it 
cheaper for Americans to buy than to rent,46 giving them a strong 
incentive to assume a large amount of debt to finance a home 
purchase. 
Federal mortgage policy was thus closely linked with zoning 
policy—both were designed to encourage home purchases.47 But 
mortgage policy and zoning were connected in a deeper way as well. 
An important underlying premise of the mortgage lending policy, 
like zoning, was that home values were primarily a function of 
neighborhood character and neighborhood stability, not simply of 
the qualities of the home itself. The lending agencies appraised the 
value of properties and their suitability for credit by determining 
how likely their surrounding neighborhoods were to maintain their 
existing character over time, looking at factors such as the age, size 
and type of housing stock in the neighborhood, the proximity of the 
neighborhood to other neighborhoods undergoing change, and, most 
infamously, the racial composition of the neighborhood.48 Given its 
 
 42. See id. at 394 (enumerating the benefits of segregating single-family residential areas 
from other types of uses).  
 43. Whereas at the end of 1916, just eight cities had enacted zoning ordinances, by the 
end of the 1920’s, nearly eight-hundred municipalities had done so. See TOLL, supra note 36, at 
193. 
 44. See HALL, supra note 35, at 318–19; JACKSON, supra note 35, at 195–218 (describing 
HOLC and FHA). 
 45. See JACKSON, supra note 35, at 293–94. 
 46. See id. at 205 (“Quite simply, it often became cheaper to buy than to rent.”). 
 47. See HALL, supra note 35, at 319 (“The central objective of the FHA was identical with 
that of zoning: it was to guarantee the security of residential real-estate values.”). 
 48. See id. at 197–203 (HOLC policy), 207–218 (FHA policy). The agencies’ policies of 
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focus on the neighborhood, the FHA naturally endorsed the use of 
single-use zoning that would ensure neighborhood homogeneity.49 
The sum total of these federal housing policies has been to 
strongly incentivize Americans to assume massive amounts of debt 
to finance home purchases by providing them with the assurance 
that the value of their homes would be protected through zoning 
ordinances that stabilize the character of the entire neighborhood. Thus, 
it is not so easy to dismiss, as the courts so often have, a 
homeowner’s claim that she should have vested rights in the zoning 
classification of her neighborhood at the time of purchase. Indeed, 
judged by either the fairness or the efficiency criterion courts have 
employed to assess developers’ reliance claims, the homeowner 
appears to have a fairly convincing case for judicial protection of her 
expectations. From the fairness perspective, considering that it has 
been long-standing national policy to induce Americans to incur 
substantial debt to finance home purchases with the assurance that 
home values would be protected against adverse land use changes, 
equity counsels that homeowners should be entitled to at least as 
much relief as the developer who has made substantial expenditures 
in good faith reliance on a development permit or site-specific 
rezoning. In fact, the homeowner’s case may be even more 
compelling than the developer’s. Many developers are in the 
business of taking risks on real estate and have the ability to 
diversify that risk across numerous projects. The homeowner, by 
contrast, typically only makes one real estate investment—the family 
home—which is by far the most significant financial investment of 
that person’s lifetime.50 The only rational reason a homeowner 
would take what seems to be such a substantial financial risk on a 
single asset is because lawmakers have deliberately undertaken to 
 
designating mixed-race and minority neighborhoods as unacceptable credit risks, deemed 
“redlining,” has of course been extremely controversial, and has been cited as a central cause of 
urban decay and interlocal segregation in many metropolitan regions. See id.; see also JANE JACOBS, 
THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 295–302 (1961) (“There is no telling how many 
city districts have been destroyed by [redlining].”). I return to the subject of interlocal 
segregation in Part IV, infra. 
 49. See JACKSON, supra note 35, at 207–208 (FHA endorsed zoning and restrictive 
covenants that would maintain neighborhood homogeneity). 
 50. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 10–11, 30 (distinguishing 
homeowners from other investors by noting lack of diversification of assets); id. at 4 (noting that 
home equity is most Americans’ most significant asset). 
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remove the risk. It would be extremely harsh and unfair for 
government to induce home purchases by insuring that investment 
against risk only to then reintroduce the risk after the purchase has 
been made, thereby catalyzing a decline in property values and 
leaving it to the homeowner to confront the likely consequences 
(loss of equity, diminished credit rating, and a possible deficiency 
judgment). 
With regard to efficiency, I noted previously that one reason 
courts protect developers’ reliance interests is to induce investment 
in real property—what developer would sink substantial resources 
into a parcel of land if the municipality could just change the rules 
and wipe out the investment at any time? Likewise, the very 
justification for federal mortgage lending and zoning policy has been 
to encourage investment in home ownership by removing 
purchasers’ concerns about investing in an asset of uncertain and 
unpredictable value.51 Moreover, the reason national policymakers 
have seen fit to encourage homeownership on a massive scale is 
because it has long been a staple of national lore that 
homeownership carries numerous advantages, such as ensuring that 
individuals have a stake in the community and the affairs of local 
government, instilling respect for the institution of private property, 
and providing a salutary environment for families.52 Thus, there is a 
strong efficiency argument for recognizing homeowners’ reliance 
interests. 
In sum, homeowners have a pretty convincing case that their 
reliance interests are at least as deserving of judicial protection as 
developers. Yet, as mentioned previously, courts have expressly held 
that neighbors simply have no vested rights to maintain pre-existing 
zoning.53 Courts rarely state their reasons for foreclosing relief to 
neighbors, however, and the reasons they do provide are not very 
persuasive.54 In the remainder of this Article, I seek to discover the 
 
 51. See supra text accompanying notes 35–53. 
 52. For a sampling of the arguments advanced in favor of homeownership, see, for 
example, JACKSON, supra note 35, at 45–72, 190–95. 
 53. See supra note 25. 
 54. The most frequently stated rationale is that awarding neighbors a vested reliance 
interest in existing zoning would make it impossible for municipal authorities to change zoning 
ordinances to meet changing conditions. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 
733 (N.Y. 1951) (“Changed or changing conditions call for changed plans, and persons who own 
property in a particular zone or use district enjoy no eternally vested right to that classification if 
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real reason why courts make this distinction. As it turns out, the 
answer to this seemingly narrow doctrinal question goes to the heart 
of the judicial approach to municipal land use decision making, and 
in the process reveals the deeply flawed nature of that approach. 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY: THE EVIDENCE FROM REGULATORY 
TAKINGS LAW 
As an initial matter, I suspect that one reason courts distinguish 
developers’ reliance claims from those of neighbors is simple 
administrative efficiency. In short, while neighbors may often have a 
legitimate grievance when the zoning is changed, courts worry that it 
would create insurmountable administrative difficulties to judicially 
recognize a remedy for such a grievance, given the enormous number 
of neighbors who could plausibly claim to have endured a 
depreciation in property values from any particular regulatory 
change. By contrast, recognizing the reliance-based claims of 
developers who have undertaken substantial improvements based on 
some site-specific regulatory assurance is a much more manageable 
task because that class is likely to be far smaller and more easily 
identified. I conclude that this explanation has some persuasive 
force, but is ultimately unsatisfying. It nevertheless proves 
important, for it will light the way toward a more compelling 
account of why courts distinguish developers’ from neighbors’ 
reliance claims. 
As I mentioned earlier, courts are rarely explicit about why they 
make this distinction between developers and neighbors. 
Nevertheless, an analogous doctrinal area, the law of regulatory 
takings, provides some evidence that the courts may indeed be 
driven by the administrative concerns sketched in the preceding 
paragraph. Consider one of the more important recent Supreme 
 
the public interest demands otherwise.”). This is an unsatisfying explanation, however, because 
it proves too much: if it has any validity, it would be an equally powerful rejoinder to developers’ 
vested rights claims, which likewise require a municipality to “freeze” its regulatory regime at a 
particular point in time. Indeed, those courts that have been most resistant to developers’ vested 
rights claims have argued that recognizing such rights would hamstrings municipalities’ 
flexibility in dealing with changing circumstances. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. 
S. Coast Reg’l Comm’n, 553 P.2d 546, 553 (Cal. 1976). Yet, the majority of courts continue to 
recognize that developers do acquire vested rights at some point in the approval process, 
whereas neighbors can never acquire vested rights. 
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Court decisions on regulatory takings, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council.55 There, legislation by the state of South Carolina designed 
to prevent beach erosion on a barrier island prohibited the plaintiff 
from building any “occupiable improvements”56 on land he owned. 
Based upon a trial court finding that the prohibition rendered 
plaintiff’s land economically “valueless,”57 the Supreme Court held 
that where a regulation “denies all economically beneficial or 
productive use of land,”58 the regulation amounts to a taking of 
property under the Fifth Amendment, unless the regulation 
coincides with some independent common-law prohibition on the 
use of land such as the law of nuisance.59 In practice, this means 
that a landowner has at least some right to alter the land from its 
natural state—to develop it—free from state interference, so long as 
she is not committing a common-law nuisance.60 By negative 
implication, those who may have an interest in leaving land 
undeveloped, such as neighboring landowners whose land may now 
be threatened by beach erosion, are out of luck unless they can assert 
a common-law cause of action against the would-be developer. Like 
the vested rights doctrine, here the Court privileges developers at 
the expense of neighboring landowners. 
The key to understanding the disparate treatment that the Lucas 
court accords developers and neighbors lies in a provocative 
footnote. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court’s holding 
would have arbitrary results because the landowner whose property 
suffered a 100% loss of all economic value due to a government 
regulation would get fully compensated under the Court’s 
“valueless” rule, whereas a landowner who suffered a 95% or even a 
99% wipeout would get no compensation.61 In a footnote, the Court 
agreed that this outcome was possible, but argued: “that occasional 
 
 55. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 56. Id. at 1009. 
 57. Id. at 1020. 
 58. Id. at 1015.  
 59. See id. at 1029–30.  
 60. See id. at 1018 (stating that deprivation of all economically beneficial or productive 
use of property typically takes the form of “requiring land to be left substantially in its natural 
state”); cf. id. at 1031 (citations omitted) (referring to the “erection of any habitable or 
productive improvements” as an “‘essential use” of one’s land).  
 61. See id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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result is no more strange than the landowner whose premises are 
taken for a highway (who recovers in full) and the landowner whose 
property is reduced to 5% of its former value by the highway (who 
recovers nothing). Takings law is full of these ‘all-or-nothing’ 
situations.”62 The Court’s footnote references a common issue in 
takings law, that of so-called “condemnation blight,” in which the 
government’s condemnation of one parcel of land (here, for a 
highway) causes neighboring properties to suffer a diminution in 
property value (as a result of increased noise, traffic congestion, 
environmental degradation, diminished quality of life, and so forth). 
Courts have uniformly held, as the Lucas majority correctly notes, 
that the owner of the condemned property is entitled to 
compensation for what was taken, but absent something more, the 
neighboring landowners are entitled to nothing for the diminution in 
property value.63 Thus, as we have seen in the case of vested rights, 
the law refuses compensation for neighbors who endure a decline in 
property values as a result of some government activity, but provides 
compensation for some other class of affected landowners, despite 
the relative equivalence in the quantum of injury suffered by both 
classes. 
The Lucas footnote does not explicitly answer why takings law 
makes these subtle differentiations, but commentators have filled in 
the blanks. According to the commentators, the rationale for this 
distinction is administrative efficiency.64 The introduction of a new 
 
 62. Id. at 1019 n.8.  
 63. A recent case is City of L.A. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2011). There, the city of Los Angeles acquired a number of properties in the vicinity of 
Los Angeles International Airport and demolished them, leaving the land vacant. Several nearby 
landowners complained that the city’s actions had drastically diminished the value of their 
property. The court held, however, these facts were insufficient to state a cause of action for a 
taking, absent a physical occupation of the complaining landowners’ property. See also FISCHEL, 
REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 169–71 (describing condemnation blight and arguing on 
efficiency grounds that landowners should often be compensated when properties are devalued 
by nearby condemnation); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 277 (2001) (arguing that condemnation blight is a “derivative taking” that should be 
compensable). 
 64. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 75 (8th ed. 2011) (arguing that 
“[w]hen a government regulation affecting property values is general in its application” 
government will face enormous difficulties “identifying and then transacting with” everyone 
affected). Frank Michelman similarly argues that liability for takings should ordinarily be denied 
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land use such as a busy highway in a once quiet rural town may have 
numerous adverse impacts, and these impacts can extend 
imperceptibly for a considerable distance. Because capitalization 
studies show that home values are sensitive to even slight changes in 
the local environment,65 any land use change could conceivably give 
rise to a very large number of plausible claims by homeowners that 
the change has caused some diminution of their property values. If a 
court were to hold that the diminution in property value suffered by 
an adjacent landowner was alone sufficient to state a compensable 
takings claim, then any other landowner who could likewise 
establish that the land use change resulted in some decrease in his or 
her property values would seemingly be entitled to compensation, 
even if the property in question were located at a considerable 
distance from the new land use and suffered only a de minimis 
decrease in value. The potential claimants could number in the 
dozens or even hundreds. Courts would be flooded with litigation 
and tasked with the unenviable chore of determining whose injuries 
are sufficiently severe to warrant compensation,66 while legislatures 
would have to worry that every regulatory intervention would 
subject them to massive liability for damages. Limiting recovery to 
those whose land was actually condemned seemingly solves these 
problems. The class is relatively smaller and more discrete, and there 
is a fair presumption that a physical occupation of one’s land has 
caused fairly serious injury to the landowner. Thus, courts are 
relieved of having to make fine distinctions and legislatures need 
only condemn land in the path of the proposed highway. In other 
words, the juridical distinction between the owner whose land is 
taken for a highway and the owner whose land is devalued by the 
highway has nothing to do with any presumed difference in the 
 
where “settlement costs” are high. He defines settlement costs as “the dollar value of the time, 
effort and resources which would be required in order to reach [adequate] compensation 
settlements. . . . Included are the costs of settling not only the particular compensation claims 
presented, but also those of all persons . . . not obviously distinguishable by the available 
settlement apparatus.” Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967). 
 65. See supra notes 26–27 (discussing capitalization). 
 66. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 299–300 (discussing traditional concern with 
opening “floodgates” in condemnation blight cases). Bell and Parchomovsky go on, however, to 
claim that the administration problem can be easily cured by requiring landowners seeking 
compensation to self-assess their damages. See id. at 300–04.  
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magnitude of injury endured by the two landowners, but entirely to 
do with the relative ability of the state’s administrative apparatus to 
address their respective grievances. 
Courts are perhaps understandably reluctant to state outright 
that seemingly arbitrary administrative concerns cause them to deny 
recompense to many landowners with compelling claims for relief. 
Nevertheless, the logic of administration is implicit in the text of the 
Lucas decision. The Court notes that the practical reason why courts 
generally permit “the government, by regulation, to affect property 
values without compensation”67 is that “[g]overnment could hardly 
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general 
law.”68 This consideration, however, “does not apply to the relatively 
rare situation where the government has deprived a landowner of all 
economically beneficial uses.”69 In other words, the class of 
individuals whose property values stand to be diminished by 
government regulation is so large that “government could hardly go 
on” if it were forced to either compensate all of those individuals for 
the diminution in property values or forego regulation entirely. 
However, the total wipeout of all economic value is sufficiently rare 
that government would only have to bear the very manageable 
burden of making the occasional payment to a truly aggrieved 
landowner, or regulating in a way that has a less harsh impact on 
that particular landowner. The individual who has suffered the total 
wipeout, then, is much like the landowner whose property has been 
taken for a highway in that she is likely to be a member of a very 
small and easily identifiable class to which courts can award 
recompense without creating too many headaches for themselves or 
for legislatures. 
The logic of Lucas and the condemnation blight cases easily 
extends to the differential treatment accorded developers’ and 
neighbors’ reliance interests in pre-existing land use regulations. 
Given the highly diffuse nature of modern land use impacts, the 
number of homeowners who could plausibly claim to have suffered a 
depreciation in property values from a single adverse land use 
 
 67. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018. 
 68. Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).  
 69. Id. 
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change is apt to be very large and amorphous.70 Awarding 
recompense to every member of this class, or attempting to ascertain 
a dividing line between compensable and noncompensable claims 
within this class, would be administratively impractical. Courts 
would be inundated with litigation, often with complex evidentiary 
problems involving the extent of the diminution of property value, 
and they would have little way of precisely delimiting the group of 
homeowners who could bring a cognizable claim for relief. The 
ability of fiscally-strapped legislatures to adopt broadly applicable 
regulations would be greatly impeded by the prospect of dozens or 
perhaps even hundreds of claimants entitled to relief for every 
diminution in property values. By contrast, limiting vested rights 
claims to developers who have made substantial expenditures and 
whose claims are based on some site-specific criteria (such as a 
permit application or small-scale rezoning) rather than a broad 
regulatory regime necessarily circumscribes the class of claimants to 
a small, discrete, and easily identified group, all of whose members, 
by virtue of having made substantial expenditures in reliance on a 
pre-existing regulatory regime, can be fairly presumed to have 
endured considerable harm from the regulatory change.71 
The foregoing account of why courts differentiate developers’ 
from neighbors’ reliance interests, while adequate as a descriptive 
matter, is also disquieting. Because the administrative concerns 
described above require that recovery be limited to a small and 
discrete class, it is necessarily the case that courts will only recognize 
a viable cause of action, as Lucas appears to acknowledge, in 
relatively “rare” cases.72 This means that a great many plaintiffs who 
are deserving of recompense will be turned out of court on the rather 
 
 70. This concern appears to be captured in the case of Hecton v. People ex rel. Dep’t of 
Transp., 58 Cal. App. 3d 653 (1976). There, the plaintiff claimed that a diminution of property 
values allegedly attributable to condemnation of neighboring properties for the construction of a 
freeway resulted in a taking of his property. The court disagreed, noting that “[t]he economic 
ramifications of the construction of a freeway are complex and unbounded.” Id. at 658. 
 71. The distinction between a small, discernible class and a large amorphous class may 
also explain why some courts have limited standing in spot zoning challenges to those who have 
suffered “special damages” above those suffered by the public as a whole. See supra note 25; see 
also SMITH & HAND, supra note 15, § 8:5 (discussing standing requirements for spot zoning 
challenges). This distinction may also underlie the administrative law dichotomy between 
legislative and quasi-adjudicative decisions, which I take up infra at text accompanying notes 
159–81. 
 72. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018. 
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arbitrary grounds of administrative efficiency. Indeed, although it 
appears to have been Lucas’s purpose to provide more robust 
protection for developers against intrusive government regulation 
than the pre-existing regulatory takings law offered, development 
advocates have been quick to criticize Lucas on the grounds that the 
“total wipeout” is so rare as to hardly ever appear in practice.73 
Likewise, developers have frequently lamented that the protection 
offered by the common-law vested rights doctrine is plainly 
inadequate because the threshold for establishing vested rights is so 
high.74 
Perhaps it is simply the case that courts have self-consciously 
sacrificed fairness to particular claimants in the interests of 
administrative expediency. But Lucas and other takings cases do 
purport to take account of the concerns of equity as well as those of 
administration. In asserting that the landowner who suffers a total 
wipeout is entitled to special solicitude, Lucas states that: 
[I]n the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or 
economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to 
indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is simply 
“adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life” in a manner 
that secures an “average reciprocity of advantage” to everyone 
concerned.75 
The Court here expresses a familiar concern in regulatory takings 
jurisprudence that the burden of government regulation should, as a 
matter of fairness, fall generally on the public and not be borne 
disproportionately by an individual or small group of landowners.76 
For the Lucas court, this means that the public at large should not be 
 
 73. For discussion and criticism of Lucas, see, for example, Epstein, supra note 17, at 
1369. See also Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering Property 
Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759 (2006). 
 74. See supra note 24 (discussing efforts by developers to strengthen vested rights 
protections by statute). 
 75. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017–18 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) See also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 76. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)(quoted in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1071) (the takings clause “was designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”). But see Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 133 
(“Legislation designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more than 
others.”). 
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able to enjoy for free the benefits of protection against beach erosion 
by imposing the burden of a total wipeout on a single landowner or 
small handful of landowners. 
If this logic is accepted, however, then there is a strong case that 
the law’s protection should extend to at least some neighbors’ 
reliance interests. One of the central problems with the siting of 
highways and other so-called “locally undesirable land uses” 
(LULUs) such as shopping malls, nightclubs, or garbage dumps is 
that while they bring benefits to the region or city as a whole, their 
costs (increased noise, traffic congestion, and so on) are largely 
borne locally by those landowners in the vicinity of the new land use, 
in the form of depreciated property values.77 While the group of 
landowners adversely affected by a new LULU may be sizeable in 
comparison to those relatively rare individuals who suffer a total 
wipeout or who have built up significant reliance interests based on 
some site-specific regulatory activity, it is nevertheless difficult to 
“indulge our usual assumption” that the “burdens and benefits of 
economic life” are being distributed relatively evenly when one 
group of landowners is asked to shoulder such a heavy burden in 
order to confer a benefit on the general public. Given that fact, it 
seems courts should provide at least some solicitude for neighbors’ 
reliance interests in pre-existing zoning regulations. Why, then, do 
they not? 
III. A PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL OF RELIANCE INTERESTS 
Contrary to appearances, the courts are actually very cognizant 
and, indeed, protective of neighbors’ reliance interests. How can this 
be the case when courts repeatedly reject neighbors’ reliance-based 
claims? This Part argues that the reason courts opt not to provide 
judicial protection for homeowners’ reliance interests is because they 
intuit that homeowners have sufficient influence with the local 
governmental authorities that make most land use decisions to 
protect their own reliance interests through the political process (by, 
for example, pressing for zoning regulations that tightly restrict new 
development). For this very reason, however, courts suspect that the 
local political process is likely to disadvantage developers, especially 
 
 77. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 789–90 (1994); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 290–94. 
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where a developer has already sunk substantial resources into a 
particular project and is thus incapable of escaping an oppressive 
regulatory regime except at great cost. As a result, courts are likely 
to deny judicial protection for neighbors’ reliance interests while 
extending it to those developers who have undertaken substantial 
expenditures in reliance on a pre-existing, regulatory status quo. 
This narrative dovetails neatly with the administrative efficiency 
account detailed in the preceding Part. Deferring neighbors’ reliance 
interests to the political process allows courts to escape from the 
dilemma of either providing judicial protection for such interests and 
thereby creating an administrative nightmare or denying such 
protection and thereby depriving many deserving claimants of relief. 
Courts can rest easy that they need not intervene to protect 
neighbors’ reliance interests because the political process is perfectly 
adequate to do so. Moreover, the very fact that creates the divide in 
administrability between neighbors’ and developers’ reliance 
interests—the relative size of the class affected—also explains the 
disparity in political power between these groups. The relatively 
large size of the class of homeowners accounts for both why the 
judiciary is incapable of providing effective protection for 
homeowners’ reliance interests and why we can expect homeowners 
to be influential in the local political process, whereas the relatively 
smaller size of the class of developers with substantial reliance 
interests makes that class both more susceptible of judicial 
protection and less likely to prevail in the political sphere.78 
In its emphasis on political process, this Part follows in the 
tradition of “public choice” scholarship. Public choice theory 
emphasizes that judicial doctrine should reflect the practical realities 
of the political system, particularly the extent to which interest 
groups have the ability to organize and influence the political 
process.79 This interest-group perspective has spawned an influential 
theory of judicial review, which suggests that courts should broadly 
defer to a political process that seems to be working effectively and 
intervene to shore up that process where it disadvantages “discrete  
 
 
 78. See POSNER, supra 64, at 75 (“[A] regulation, because it affects more people than a 
single taking, is more likely to mobilize effective political opposition.”). 
 79. See generally FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 13; STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 13.  
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and insular minorities” who cannot effectively form interest 
groups.80 
A number of scholars have applied public choice theory to land 
use decision making, with most focusing specifically on the law of 
regulatory takings.81 Saul Levmore, for example, uses public choice 
theory to explain the distinction we have seen in takings law 
between physical occupations and regulatory burdens (the 
“condemnation blight” scenario). Because relatively fewer 
individuals will have their property condemned than will see their 
property values decline from a nearby condemnation, the former will 
have a less effective opportunity than the latter to influence the 
political process to press their interests. He writes: 
[P]hysical takings (as opposed to regulatory or tax burdens) usually 
burden fewer people, who will have relatively more trouble 
organizing into a political force. Often the government takes 
property from just one or two property owners, while regulatory 
burdens almost always affect large numbers . . . . [T]he 
nonphysical burdens of such a project are likely to fall on thousands 
of properties (such as the homeowners who lose value because of 
noise from the new highway) whose owners can more easily 
organize than can the set of owners whose properties are physically 
taken.82 
Levmore argues accordingly that regulatory takings law appropriately 
awards compensation to those whose land has been condemned but 
not to those whose property values have been affected by a 
condemnation. 
In the following Part, I refine the public choice account in two 
principal ways. First, I argue that reliance, rather than merely group 
size, has driven the disparity in political power between developers 
and homeowners. On one hand, the large size of a group is no 
assurance of political power, because organization is often more 
 
 80. This theory of judicial review traces its origins to the Supreme Court’s famous fourth 
footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and was most 
fully elaborated in John Hart Ely’s classic work DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 73–179 (1980). Under this theory, the judiciary’s proper role is one of monitoring the 
political process to ensure that it has incorporated the appropriate degree of deliberation, 
accommodation of competing interests, and solicitude for minorities.  
 81. See, e.g., FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 114–40; Michelman, supra 
note 64, at 1217–18.  
 82. Levmore, supra note 14, at 320. 
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important than sheer size; indeed, public choice scholarship has 
demonstrated that smaller groups can often organize much more 
effectively than larger groups.83 What assures homeowners of 
political power, in addition to their relative size, is that their 
enormous stake in their homes gives them tremendous motivation 
to organize and be involved in local politics in order to protect their 
property values. On the other hand, although developers may be a 
small and politically isolated group, they can easily resist unfavorable 
regulation in one municipality to the extent they can simply exit to a 
neighboring jurisdiction. Once a developer invests substantial 
resources into a particular project, however, her exit costs rise 
dramatically and make it harder for her to escape an exploitative 
regulatory regime. Thus, reliance interests play a central role in 
explaining both the homeowners’ predominance within the local 
political process and the developer’s vulnerability within that same 
process. 
The second refinement is that courts have not simply accepted 
the descriptive point that homeowners tend to be powerful and 
adjusted the doctrine around that reality. Rather, courts have taken 
an affirmative role in enabling homeowners to capture the political 
process for their own ends, perhaps because courts are all too keenly 
aware of their own institutional limitations in directly enforcing 
homeowners’ reliance interests. The courts have facilitated 
homeowner domination of the local political process principally in 
two ways: 1) they have broadly legitimized municipalities’ use of the 
zoning power to protect homeowners’ reliance interests; and 2) they 
have liberally endorsed state policies that favor the proliferation of 
small suburban municipalities in which homeowners can be assured 
of being the politically dominant faction. This last point offers an 
ironic twist on the public choice account: while that account hinges 
on the class of homeowners being sufficiently large to have political 
clout and defy judicial cognizability, it also demands that the class be 
sufficiently small to permit effective organization and domination of 
the local political process. This reinforces my point that organization  
 
 
 83. See MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (postulating that small 
groups of intensely interested individuals can more effectively organize as interest groups than 
large groups whose members are each less intensely interested). 
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is at least as important as size in assuring that homeowners are 
politically powerful. 
Once we understand the role courts have played in creating a 
“majoritarian” local political process that systematically favors 
homeowners, we can likewise understand why they are especially 
solicitous of developers’ reliance interests. A small polity dominated 
by a particular faction with fairly uniform interests raises the classic 
Madisonian concern that a politically unpopular minority (here, 
developers) may be consistently exploited within the political 
process.84 Thus, it makes sense that courts would complement their 
deference to a political process dominated by homeowners with 
special judicial solicitude for developers in circumstances where 
developers would be especially susceptible to majoritarian 
exploitation—such as, where they have expended substantial 
resources in reliance on a site-specific regulatory assurance. 
Section A below explains how homeowners’ reliance interests, 
combined with the assistance of the courts, enables homeowners to 
come out ahead in the local political process under the basic public 
choice model. Section B then shows how courts’ solicitude for 
developers’ reliance interests can likewise be traced to the public 
choice model. 
A. Homeowners and the Public Choice Model of Local Government 
According to economist William Fischel, local politics are 
dominated by “homevoters”: homeowners who consistently press for 
policies that will maximize the value of their most valuable asset—
their homes.85 This means, among other things, that homevoters 
will consistently place pressure on municipal authorities for highly 
restrictive zoning regulations that prevent the siting of any new 
development that may threaten property values.86 For this reason, 
homevoters have often been given the derisive moniker NIMBYs 
(“Not in My Backyard”). Because these NIMBYs/homevoters are the 
 
 84. See infra text accompanying notes 150–59 (on Madison’s concern with faction and 
how it applies to land use politics in small municipalities). 
 85. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 4–12, 72–93. 
 86. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 8 (discussing various Land Use conflicts involving 
NIMBYs (“Not in my backyard”)). 
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dominant political faction in most municipalities, local governments 
must accede to their wishes. 
What makes homevoters so dominant in local politics? In part, 
as Levmore notes, it is a question of numbers. Most municipalities 
accord voting rights only to residents of the municipality.87 And the 
majority of local governments in the United States are small, 
suburban municipalities in which the overwhelming majority of 
residents, and hence voters, are homeowners.88 
It is curious, though, that theorists like Levmore would place so 
much emphasis on size when one of the most critical insights of 
public choice theory is that smaller groups often do a better job of 
organizing to influence public policy than larger groups.89 This is 
both because smaller groups face fewer barriers to organizing—for 
example, they can more easily identify sympathizers and police free-
riding—and because regulation tends to visit benefits and burdens 
disproportionately on particular small groups, providing those 
groups with the motivation to be politically active.90 As Daniel 
Farber states, in a critique of Levmore, “[i]f public choice has any 
one key finding, it is that small groups with high stakes have a 
disproportionately great influence on the political process.”91 
The major reason homeowners are so politically powerful at the 
local level is thus not their size, but the “high stakes” they possess in 
local politics; that is, their reliance interests. As discussed in Part 
I.B., homeowners stand to lose a great deal if their property values 
depreciate from the date of purchase, and property values are heavily 
determined by a municipality’s zoning regulations.92 As Fischel has 
 
 87. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 38, at 440. 
 88. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I – The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 77 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part I] (stating that three-
quarters of municipalities have fewer than 55,000 residents); Fischel, NIMBYs, supra note 4, at 
145 (stating that two-thirds of homes are owner-occupied and homeowners vote fifty percent 
more frequently than renters).  
 89. See OLSEN, supra note 83 (postulating that small groups of intensely interested 
individuals can more effectively organize as interest groups than large groups whose members 
are each less intensely interested). 
 90. See generally Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 37–41 (1991). 
 91. See Daniel Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 289 
(1992).  
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 26–33.  
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detailed, the size of the homeowner’s stake gives her a huge 
incentive to be active in the local political process in order to ensure 
that the political process operates to protect the value of her home.93 
Indeed, we recall that one of the central purposes of the long-
standing national policy in favor of homeownership has been 
precisely to induce Americans to have a stake in the affairs of 
government.94 Thus, the combination of size and motivation makes 
the homeowner a powerful force in local politics. 
Perhaps an equally important factor in explaining homeowner 
dominance in local government is the role of the courts. After some 
initial reluctance, courts have repeatedly affirmed that municipalities 
may legitimately use the zoning power to protect homeowners’ 
reliance interests. Furthermore, courts have played an active role in 
facilitating homeowner control of the local political process by 
broadly affirming state policies that enable homeowners to create 
local governments in which they call the shots. In short, despite the 
superficial appearance that courts are not particularly concerned 
about homeowners’ reliance interests, in reality courts have taken 
major steps to empower homeowners to protect their own reliance 
interests, thus obviating the need for courts to provide direct judicial 
protection for those interests.  
1. Judicial deference to zoning 
For the past century, courts have accepted as a matter of course 
that zoning is a legitimate means of protecting the reliance interests 
of homeowners. When zoning was first introduced in the United 
States in the early twentieth century, many courts greeted it with 
considerable skepticism, seeing zoning as an encroachment on a 
landowner’s constitutional right to make unrestricted use of her 
property95 and a crude means of social segregation.96 Rather quickly, 
 
 93. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 8–12, 30, 74–76; see also 
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 259 (“[M]ost voters in smaller jurisdictions are 
homeowners. They have an incentive to pay attention to politics: good decisions will increase the 
value of their major asset, and bad ones will reduce it. Political scientists have long been 
impressed by the high rate of participation by middle-class homeowners in local politics.”). 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 51–52. 
 95. See Ignaciunas v. Risley, 121 A. 783, 785 (N.J. 1923) (“A law which forbids a certain 
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though, the judicial tide turned in favor of zoning, as courts began to 
recognize the desirability of stabilizing single-family residential 
neighborhoods. In the landmark Euclid decision, the United States 
Supreme Court heartily endorsed zoning as a useful means for 
preventing the invasion of unwanted uses into single-family 
residential neighborhoods, despite the fact that the zoning ordinance 
at issue caused the appellant to suffer a 75% decline in the value of 
its property because of new use restrictions.97 
Early decisions made it clear that zoning was legitimate because 
it aimed to secure a society of homeowners with a firm stake in the 
affairs of government. For example, in upholding a zoning ordinance 
that created exclusive districts for single-family homes, the 
California Supreme Court stated: 
The establishment of single family residence districts offers 
inducements, not only to the wealthy, but to those of moderate 
means to own their own homes. With ownership comes stability . . 
. . With ownership comes increased interest in the promotion of 
public agencies, such as church and school, which have for their 
purpose a desired development of the moral and mental make-up of 
the citizenry of the country. With ownership of one’s home comes 
recognition of the individual’s responsibility for his share in the 
safeguarding of the welfare of the community . . . .98 
Courts likewise lauded zoning for protecting homeowners’ 
expectations in pre-existing property values. According to one court: 
“The stabilizing of property values, and giving some assurance to the 
public that, if property is purchased in a residential district, its value as 
such will be preserved, is probably the most cogent reason back of 
zoning ordinances.”99 
 
use of property deprives it of an essential attribute. The result in effect is a proscription of its 
ownership.”); Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 514–15 (Tex. 1921) (“The substantial value 
of property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied, the value of the property is annihilated 
and ownership is rendered a barren right.”). 
 96. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d 272 U.S. 365 
(1926) (“In the last analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and 
segregate them according to their income or situation in life.”). 
 97. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 98. Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works of L.A., 234 P. 381, 387 (Cal. 1925).  
 99. Marrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F.2d 541, 548 (D. Kan. 1928); see also Flower Hill Bldg. Corp. 
v. Vill. of Flower Hill, 100 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (purpose of zoning ordinance is 
to protect residents against “radical zoning changes” that will diminish property values). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2014 10:26 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
984 
Ever since zoning’s legitimacy was established in the early part of 
the century, courts have repeatedly cited the protection of property 
values as one of zoning’s central purposes and have found that 
purpose sufficiently weighty to immunize zoning against all manner 
of legal challenges.100 In a similar vein, courts have frequently held 
that the protection of neighboring landowners’ reliance interests in a 
pre-existing regulatory scheme is a legitimate reason for 
municipalities to decline to change their zoning regulations.101 
 
 100. See, e.g., Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1993) (no due 
process violation in refusing authorization to site a warehouse in a residential neighborhood 
because record showed that city’s decision was motivated by concerns over safety, traffic, noise, 
and decreased property values); Greenbriar v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(no due process violation because city’s refusal to authorize rezoning was rationally based on 
concerns that rezoning would cause decrease in neighboring property values); Dry Creek 
Partners, LLC v. Ada Cnty. Comm’rs, 217 P.3d 1282, 1291 (Idaho 2009) (zoning’s valid 
purposes include “preventing visual blight, stabilizing neighborhoods, maintaining 
neighborhood property values, and preserving the character of the community”); City of 
Lewiston v. Knieriem, 685 P.2d 821, 825 (Idaho 1984) (restrictions on siting of mobile homes 
was legitimate because one of the central purposes of zoning is to “conserve and stabilize 
property values”); Mack T. Anderson Ins. Agency, Inc. v. City of Belgrade, 803 P.2d 648, 651 
(Mont. 1990) (upholding exclusion of mobile homes from general residential district, citing “a 
concern for long-term planning, the unique qualities of manufactured homes, and the property 
values of surrounding residents”); Farley v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 636 A.2d 1232, 1238 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1993) (“[P]revention of undue concentration of population, prevention of traffic 
congestion and maintenance of property values are all legitimate purposes of zoning.”). 
Some modern courts refuse to consider property values standing alone as a legitimate 
basis for land use controls and require that this be coupled with some other valid consideration. 
See, e.g., Redevelopment Auth. of Oil City v. Woodring, 445 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa. 1982) 
(“[N]either aesthetic reasons nor the conservation of property values or the stabilization of 
economic values in a township are, singly or combined, sufficient to promote the health or the 
morals or the safety or the general welfare of the township or its inhabitants or property 
owners.”) (quoting Appeal of Medinger, 104 A.2d 118, 122 (Pa. 1954)). Because standards such 
as “morals” and “general welfare” are highly subjective, however, courts often consider 
diminished property values to be prima facie evidence that some important non-economic value 
is being affected. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 75–79 (1966) (courts are not 
concerned about property values per se but see property values as a sign that some exogenous 
value such as neighborhood character is being impacted). Altogether, this discussion suggests 
that courts are somewhat uncomfortable with explicitly permitting homeowners’ economic self-
interest to serve as the basis of municipal land use policies, but nevertheless allow such self-
interest to reign under the more neutral guise of “morals” or “general welfare.”  
 101. See Burns v. City of Des Peres, 534 F.2d 103, 110 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusal to rezone 
properly based on opposition from neighboring landowners because “[p]roperty owners in the 
area who have relied on the existing zoning classification have an interest in the perpetuation of 
such scheme unless the public good dictates a change”); State ex rel. Barber & Sons Tobacco Co. 
v. Jackson Cnty., 869 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (following Burns for the proposition 
that reliance interests of neighbors are a legitimate basis on which to deny a rezone). See also 
Dover v. City of Jackson, 541 S.E.2d 92, 96 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding denial of rezone 
from residential to commercial, citing, in part, the legitimate governmental interest in preserving 
the existing character of the neighborhood); Du Page Trust Co. v. Cnty. of Du Page, 335 N.E.2d 
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Modern courts have gone even further than the early decisions in 
a few key respects. Where early courts were reluctant to recognize 
that aesthetics could be a valid purpose of land use regulations, 
modern courts have broadly upheld sweeping aesthetic and historic 
preservation laws, often by citing the connection between aesthetic 
or historic significance and neighborhood property values.102 In 
addition, where early courts were perhaps willfully oblivious to the 
politicization of zoning, many modern courts have explicitly 
acknowledged that the local political process is dominated by owners 
of developed land who seek to use that process to protect their 
reliance interests by preventing new development. Rather than 
condemning zoning on these grounds, however, the courts have 
accepted that the capture of the local political process by interest 
groups intent on using regulation to advance their own self-interest 
is a legitimate part of our democratic system.103 
A striking example of this judicial approach is the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Coniston Corp. v. Village of 
Hoffman Estates,104 authored by one of the most prominent public 
 
61, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (upholding denial of rezone from residential to commercial, citing, in 
part, the reliance interests of homeowners in maintaining the residential character of the area). 
Similarly, courts have held that reliance interests are a valid basis for distinguishing between 
pre-existing uses and prospective uses when formulating new land use regulations. For instance, 
in Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 1995), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
rejected an equal protection challenge against a zoning ordinance that prohibited houseboats 
within city limits, but had a grandfather provision for existing houseboats on a particular river. 
The court upheld the grandfather provision as a rational means by which to achieve the 
legitimate governmental goal of protecting the reliance interests of existing homeowners: “A 
state may legitimately use grandfather provisions to protect property owners’ reliance interests.” 
Id. at 922. I examine the implications of distinguishing pre-existing from prospective uses 
further infra in Part IV. 
 102. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Mo. 1970) 
(acknowledging that protection of property values is valid purpose supporting aesthetic 
regulation); Farley v. Graney, 119 S.E.2d 833, 848 (W. Va. 1960) (recognizing ordinance 
regulating locations of junk yards appropriate because, inter alia, such uses have “a tendency to 
depress neighborhood property values”); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Weiland, 
69 N.W.2d 217 (Wis. 1955) (holding that aesthetic zoning for the purpose of preserving 
property values “falls within the exercise of the [state’s] police power . . .” because “[a]nything 
that tends to destroy property value . . . “necessarily adversely affects the prosperity, and 
therefore the general welfare, of the entire village”). 
 103. As I explore infra in Part III.B.1, a few courts have considered the parochial nature of 
the local political process to justify more searching judicial review, but those cases are in the 
minority. 
 104. 844 F.2d 461, 469 (7th Cir. 1988).  
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choice theorists, Judge Richard Posner. In Coniston, a developer 
brought a Constitutional due process challenge against a city 
council’s denial of the developer’s site plan for a commercial office 
building. The court noted that, although the council had given no 
reason for the decision, it seemed plausible that the decision was “an 
effort to transfer wealth from the plaintiffs” to existing owners of 
office space by protecting the existing landowners from 
competition.105 The court nevertheless rebuffed the challenge, 
stating that “much governmental action is protectionist or 
anticompetitive and nothing is more common in zoning disputes 
than selfish opposition to zoning changes.”106 As the court held: 
“The Constitution . . . does not outlaw the characteristic operations 
of democratic (or perhaps of any) government, operations which are 
permeated by pressure from special interests.”107 
Numerous other decisions have similarly concluded that it is 
legitimate for zoning decisions to be rooted in the local 
constituency’s desire to protect its pre-existing reliance interests.108 
Most of these cases, unlike Coniston, involve homeowners rather than 
owners of commercial office buildings. For example, in a decision by 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Gardner v. City of Baltimore 
Mayor,109 the Court held that the planning commission for the city 
of Baltimore was justified in denying approval of a development 
 
 105. Id. at 467. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 48 F.3d 810, 828–29 (4th Cir. 1995) (“It is not 
pernicious per se for a zoning authority to be influenced by political pressure in the 
community.”); Gardner v. City of Baltimore Mayor, 969 F.2d 63, 72 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Those who 
live near proposed development have the most significant personal stake in the outcome of land-
use decisions and are entitled, under our system of government, to organize and exert whatever 
political influence they might have. Nor is it necessarily improper for municipal government to 
consider or act upon such political pressure. Such give-and-take between government officials 
and an engaged citizenry is what democracy is about.”); Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. 
v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 46 (1st Cir. 1992) (refusal to issue waste disposal permit permissibly 
based on local opposition to waste dump siting); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 
1570, 1579 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[A] planning commission or a City Council is not a judicial 
forum; it is a legislative body held democratically accountable” through the political process.); 
Burns v. City of Des Peres, 534 F.2d 103, 110 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusal to rezone properly based 
on opposition from neighboring landowners because “[p]roperty owners in the area who have 
relied on the existing zoning classification have an interest in the perpetuation of such scheme 
unless the public good dictates a change”). 
 109. 969 F.2d at 72. 
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proposal. The developer argued that it had been deprived of due 
process because the planning commission had acted at the behest of 
“politically influential residents”110 who opposed all development 
near their neighborhood. The court held, however, that: 
Those who live near proposed development have the most 
significant personal stake in the outcome of land-use decisions and 
are entitled, under our system of government, to organize and exert 
whatever political influence they might have. Nor is it necessarily 
improper for municipal government to consider or act upon such 
political pressure. Such give-and-take between government officials 
and an engaged citizenry is what democracy is about.111 
Gardner affirms the central tenet of the public choice model of 
local government, which is that homeowners indeed have an 
enormous “stake” in land use decisions that induces them to 
participate actively in local government. Decisions like Gardner and 
Coniston take the next step, however, in holding that landowners 
have not only the incentive but also the right to capture the reins of 
local government and use them to protect that “stake.” 
2. Judicial endorsement of small, suburban municipalities 
What has been said so far suggests that courts have played a 
fairly passive role, deferring to a local political process that they 
acknowledge is captive to homeowners who use that process to 
protect their own reliance interests. In fact, courts have taken a 
much more active role—they have affirmatively helped to place 
homeowners in power in local politics so that homeowners can 
protect their own reliance interests without the need for ad hoc 
judicial protection. Courts have done this by broadly endorsing state 
policies that favor the proliferation of small suburban municipalities 
in which homeowners are practically assured of being the dominant 
political faction. 
As discussed above, the public choice model holds that 
homevoters control the local political process because of their 
relative size and their enormous incentives to participate in local 
politics.112 Standing alone, though, these characteristics would be 
 
 110. Id. at 71. 
 111. Id. at 72. 
 112. See supra text accompanying notes 86–94. 
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insufficient to bestow homeowners with a reliable degree of political 
control. Political scientists have shown that large, diverse cities tend 
to be characterized by a “pluralist” governance model in which there 
are many sizeable, well-organized, and highly motivated pressure 
groups who all exercise some influence with city hall.113 In a 
pluralist system, homeowners might be powerful, but they would 
have to share power with groups such as renters, construction firms, 
labor unions, and developers, all of whom would likely have more 
favorable attitudes toward new development than homeowners.114 
The intensity of homeowner interests in particular land use matters 
would be counterbalanced by the deep pockets and repeat-player 
advantages of developers, or other groups, who could exercise 
outsized influence through their ability to make campaign 
contributions and to help grow a dwindling urban tax base with new 
development.115 And, in a large city, homeowners might not share 
uniform interests if they are widely diffused geographically and 
would thus feel the impacts of different proposed land use changes 
in widely disparate ways. As such, the balance of empirical literature 
generally concludes that homeowners exercise considerably less 
influence in larger, more diverse cities.116 
In order for homeowners to effectively protect their own reliance 
interests by preventing new development, then, it is not enough for 
 
 113. See ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, PREFACE]; FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra 
note 14, at 328 (“[T]he biggest cities are apt to have pluralistic politics because of their large 
population and resulting heterogeneity of interest groups.”); Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions 
for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 89 (1998) (noting that with increasing size, cities are 
more vulnerable to influence by “rent-seeking groups such as political machines, municipal 
unions, public works lobbies, and downtown business interests”). 
 114. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 90–97 (conceding that 
homeowners have far less influence in more diverse urban centers than in smaller suburbs); 
Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 38, at 372–73 (noting that in larger cities, 
neighborhood groups cannot control their own zoning because they must share power with 
other interests, but smaller suburbs, which are frequently just incorporated neighborhoods, can 
zone to protect the neighborhood’s interests). 
 115. See, e.g., LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 11, at 50–98, 154–62, 230–32. On developers 
being repeat players, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 306 (3d ed. 
2005). 
 116. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 115, at 305; FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra 
note 14, at 90–92. As I explain infra in Part IV.A, however, there is some evidence emerging that 
homeowners are able to exert outsize influence in larger cities as well. For reasons I discuss 
there, I am not entirely convinced by this evidence.  
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courts to merely defer to the local political process. Rather, 
homeowners must have the ability to form a stable political coalition 
with other, similarly motivated homeowners that can reliably 
dominate the local political process without countervailing pressure 
from interest groups with divergent demands—a “majoritarian” 
rather than pluralist political system.117 The best way to accomplish 
this is by carving out a small, homogenous municipality comprised 
primarily of homeowners who will all be affected in relatively similar 
ways by any new land use siting.118 In such a municipality, 
homeowners would exercise tight control over the land use power to 
prevent unwanted new development and to maintain the general 
homogeneity of the community, such as, for example, by zoning 
exclusively for large-lot, single-family homes.119 Furthermore, a 
small jurisdiction dominated by homeowners would dilute the 
influence of deep-pocketed developers, as campaign contributions 
from developers would be less decisive in a small, homogenous 
jurisdiction than in a large, diverse one, and the community could 
manage its tax base with fiscal zoning rather than by luring big-
ticket development.120 Thus, if it were the case that policymakers 
and courts desired to provide homeowners with the ability to protect 
their own reliance interests through the local political process, we 
would expect them to facilitate the proliferation of very small 
suburban municipalities dominated by homeowners.  
Indeed, that is exactly what has happened. Most states have 
enacted a suite of policies that enable and, indeed, encourage the 
creation of small, homeowner-dominated suburban municipalities, 
and courts, by and large, have been extremely deferential towards 
these policies. Courts liberally permit the incorporation of new 
 
 117. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 105–07 (contrasting majoritarian 
with pluralist political system); id. at 328–29 (small suburbs are majoritarian; large cities are 
pluralistic). 
 118. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: 
Addressing the Barriers to the New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2018 (2000) (stating that 
“smallness and homogeneity” of suburbs enables them effectively “to wield local powers to 
exclude undesirables and pursue the locality’s collective self-interest”). 
 119. See id.; FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 259–62 (discussing use of 
fiscal zoning to ensure homogeneity in small suburbs). 
 120. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 259–62 (on advantages of fiscal 
zoning); id. at 287 (campaign contributions ineffective in small governments). 
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municipalities by groups as small as seventy-five individuals121 and 
will typically approve petitions for incorporation as a matter of 
course—there is little need for the petitioners to demonstrate that 
they represent a cohesive community.122 As such, areas routinely 
incorporate because they prefer to live in a town composed 
exclusively of residences or because they wish to seize control of the 
land use power to place tight constrictions on new development—
both purposes the courts consider perfectly legitimate.123 Indeed, 
historians have demonstrated that the modern trend toward the 
liberalization of incorporation standards—which led to a rash of new 
incorporations—coincided with the Supreme Court’s placing its 
imprimatur on the constitutionality of zoning.124 In other words, 
communities were incorporating specifically in order to control their 
own land use. 
Richard Briffault reports that courts have also endorsed a 
number of other state policies designed to enable the proliferation of 
small suburban communities. Where states have incentivized 
incorporation, such as by delegating the zoning power and the ability 
to assess property taxes to incorporated communities, courts have 
been broadly deferential.125 And courts have likewise endorsed state 
policies designed to facilitate incorporation by minimizing the tax 
burden of incorporation, such as the use of special-purpose districts 
and interlocal contracting that enable local governments to cheaply 
outsource the provision of services such as water, police, or pest 
control while retaining local autonomy over the land use and taxing 
powers.126 Finally, courts largely defer to state laws enabling small 
 
 121. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 88, at 74. 
 122. See id. at 75–76 (courts liberally sustain municipal incorporations without regard to 
whether the area to be incorporated represents a “community of interest”). 
 123. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 242–58 (describing 
incorporations in Seattle metropolitan region); Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 38, at 
361. See also In re Incorporation of Oconomowoc Lake, 97 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Wis. 1959) (“A 
community devoted exclusively to residential development and possessing that spirit of 
togetherness or that core of community spirit characterized by a unity of action and purpose is a 
village in fact within the meaning of the constitution. These villages in fact may only be 
concerned with those services necessary for residential community development such as fire and 
police protection, zoning and sanitation.”). 
 124. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 215. 
 125. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 38, at 363–74. 
 126. See id. at 374–82. 
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unincorporated areas to resist annexation to larger communities.127 
As a result of this combination of policies, there are over 19,000 
incorporated general-purpose municipalities today, the vast majority 
of which are exceptionally small (three-quarters have fewer than 
5,000 residents) and primarily composed of homeowners.128 
As Briffault notes, courts see the proliferation of small local 
governments “as a healthy development, reflecting an area’s growth 
and the democratic desires of its residents.”129 Small jurisdiction 
size is seen as a way of bringing government closer to the people and 
enabling them to have tighter control over their governmental 
policies. As one court put it, residents of small communities often 
prefer to live “relatively free from regulation and have a direct voice 
in such municipal matters as zoning or the granting of a liquor 
license.”130 Courts’ abiding concern in boundary change cases 
appears to be one of self-determination for smaller local areas.131 
Given that the courts have taken such an active role in assuring 
homeowners a reliable degree of political control in suburban 
municipalities, it makes sense that they would refrain from providing 
direct judicial protection for homeowners’ reliance interests by 
awarding them vested rights in existing zoning regulations. Indeed, 
it may very well be that the reason courts have given homeowners 
the means to protect their own reliance interests through the 
political process is to spare themselves the administrative difficulties 
of adjudicating homeowners’ reliance claims on an ad hoc basis. In 
any event, the foregoing discussion demonstrates that courts have 
been very active in facilitating and legitimizing a local political 
process in which homeowners have the ability to protect their own 
reliance interests. 
 
 127. See id. at 361–62.  
 128. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 88, at 77 (three-quarters of municipalities 
have fewer than 5,000 residents); Fischel, NIMBYs, supra note 4, at 145 (two-thirds of homes 
are owner-occupied, and homeowners vote fifty percent more frequently than renters). 
 129. Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 88, at 77. 
 130. Moorman v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467, 469 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (upholding statute 
permitting smaller cities to annex contiguous portions of larger cities with consent of majority of 
residents in area to be annexed).  
 131. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 838 P.2d 1198, 1200 (Cal. 
1992) (“[C]ommunity residents and landowners often prefer to govern their local affairs insofar 
as possible, and cityhood provides them with greater opportunities for self-determination than 
does residence or ownership in a more amorphous unincorporated area.”). 
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3. The primacy of reliance 
It could be argued that the courts’ deference to local land use 
decision making and state structuring of local governments has less 
to do with an affirmative judicial solicitude for reliance interests and 
more to do with a general institutional posture of judicial restraint. 
Courts subject most legislation—including land use legislation—to 
the minimal scrutiny of “rational basis review,” under which laws 
require a merely reasonable justification to survive judicial review, 
not an especially important or compelling one.132 And under the 
venerable Hunter doctrine, which holds that local governments are 
mere creatures of the state, courts are supposed to be especially 
deferential toward state decisions regarding the organization of local 
governments.133 In other words, arguably reliance interests are not 
so significant as to compel judicial deference; rather, deference is the 
court’s default stance, and reliance is simply one of many 
rationalizations courts can use to justify that stance. 
It is difficult to conclusively answer this potential objection, as 
doing so would require an examination of subjective judicial 
motivations. Nevertheless, I have reason to suspect that reliance, 
rather than a general policy of deference, is driving judicial review in 
this area. As an initial matter, the rational basis review to which 
courts have long subjected most land use regulation is actually 
inconsistent with the legal doctrine governing municipalities. Unlike 
states, local government actions are not entitled to a presumption of 
legitimacy; according to the well-known Dillon’s Rule, courts are 
required to strictly construe any delegation of power from the state 
to the local level.134 Virtually all local governments exercise the land 
 
 132. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that most 
land use regulations are subject to rational basis review). 
 133. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (holding that state has broad 
power to dictate the terms of municipal boundary change because “[m]unicipal corporations are 
political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the 
governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted to them . . . .”); see also Town of Lockport 
v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, 430 U.S. 259, 269 (1977) (holding that 
states have “wide discretion . . . in forming and allocating governmental tasks to local 
subdivisions”).  
 134. See, e.g., JOHN DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 9, at 2122 
(1st ed. 1872); Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The 
Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83; Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal 
Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1109–13 (1980).  
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use power pursuant to a state legislative delegation, which means 
that, in principle, courts should be construing the zoning power very 
narrowly. Yet, as we have seen, the courts have given local zoning 
laws a wide berth. By contrast, courts have often been rather 
skeptical of state delegations in other areas.135 There must be some 
reason why courts have quietly violated the spirit of Dillon’s Rule in 
land use cases while observing it elsewhere. 
Likewise, although the Hunter doctrine commands deference to 
state structuring of local governments, a more recent doctrinal line 
beginning with Avery v. Midland County136 holds that states cannot 
simply structure local governments however they like but must 
conform local governments to constitutional mandates such as the 
one person/one vote rule.137 Courts have, however, disregarded the 
one person/one vote rule when it comes to local government 
formation—upholding, for example, state policies that permit small 
areas to incorporate without obtaining consent from residents of the 
surrounding area.138 The courts have never articulated a persuasive 
reason for why this deviation from the Avery rule is permissible.139  
I suspect that the significance of reliance interests explains these 
doctrinal inconsistencies. First, as already detailed, courts frequently 
 
 135. See, e.g., Olesen v. Town of Hurley, 691 N.W.2d 324 (S.D. 2004) (delegation 
permitting municipality to operate a bar did not authorize it to serve food); Arlington Cnty. v. 
White, 528 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2000) (statute authorizing municipalities to provide health benefits 
to employees and their dependents did not include authority to define dependents to encompass 
same-sex partners). 
 136. 390 U.S. 474, 485–86 (1968). 
 137. See also, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Hadley v. Junior 
College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School District 
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
 138. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 838 P.2d 1198, 1200 
(Cal. 1992) (holding that state could constitutionally restrict vote on incorporation of new city 
to the voters residing within the territory to be incorporated notwithstanding one person/one 
vote rule, holding that “the essence of this case is not the fundamental right to vote, but the 
state's plenary power to set the conditions under which its political subdivisions are created”); cf. 
Lockport, 430 U.S. at 269 (holding that one person/one vote rule is inapplicable to state 
structuring of local governments because, per Hunter, states have “wide discretion . . . in 
forming and allocating governmental tasks to local subdivisions).  
 139. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local 
Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1993) (criticizing inconsistent application of one 
person/one vote rule to local governments). As I explain infra at notes 219–25 and 
accompanying text, it may be that courts indulge the assumption that local government actions 
have no extraterritorial impacts and therefore that residents living outside areas to be 
incorporated simply have no interest in the matter. I argue there, however, that this assumption 
is highly implausible. 
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invoke reliance interests in justifying deference to local land use 
decision making and state structuring of local governments. Second, 
when courts have gone against the grain of judicial deference and 
invalidated local zoning enactments, it has frequently been in order 
to protect reliance interests. We have already seen, and will see 
further below, how courts will intervene into the political process on 
occasion to protect developers’ reliance interests. But courts will also 
disturb the political process to protect homeowners’ reliance interests 
where courts are convinced that the political process is incapable of 
adequately protecting those interests. 
I illustrate this point by examining two contexts in which courts 
have acted affirmatively to protect homeowners' reliance interests 
against an unfavorable political environment: variances and 
the extraterritorial impacts of municipal land use regulations. As 
shown previously, the local political process usually advantages 
homeowners, because of their relative numbers and their extremely 
high degree of motivation to be active in local government. For this 
reason, I have argued, courts will usually defer to the political 
process so that homeowners can protect their own reliance interests. 
On occasion, however, that process can work to the disadvantage of 
homeowners. For instance, while many land use decisions (such as 
rezonings) are made by elected city officials, who are accountable to 
the demands of their constituents, some land use decisions are made 
by unelected administrative bodies which are not so accountable. 
Thus, requests for a variance (an application by a developer to 
deviate from the strict requirements of a zoning ordinance because 
of a hardship), are typically adjudicated by an appointed body such 
as a zoning board of adjustment.140 Because the zoning board is 
insulated from the political pressure of homeowners, there is a risk 
that the board will grant variances without regard to homeowners’ 
reliance interests in the pre-existing zoning scheme.141 Perhaps for  
 
 
 
 140. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 115, at 286–96 (discussing variances). 
 141. Studies have demonstrated that zoning boards approve an extremely high number of 
variance requests. See, e.g., id. at 294–95 (collecting studies).  
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this reason, courts apply stricter judicial review to the granting of 
variances than to rezonings and other legislative decisions.142 
This reasoning is made explicit in Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic 
Community v. County of Los Angeles.143 There, the California Supreme 
Court set forth rigorous standards for the judiciary to apply in 
reviewing municipal decisions regarding the approval of variances. 
The court reasoned that “the membership of some zoning boards 
may be inadequately insulated from the interests whose advocates 
most frequently seek variances.”144 In other words, because 
developers are likely to be repeat players before zoning boards, (and 
because there is no countervailing political pressure from 
homeowners) there is a serious risk that zoning boards will be 
biased in favor of developers. Accordingly, the Topanga court stated, 
strict judicial scrutiny is necessary 
in order to protect the interests of those who hold rights in 
property nearby the parcel for which a variance is sought. A zoning 
scheme, after all, is similar in some respects to a contract; each 
party foregoes rights to use its land as it wishes in return for the 
assurance that the use of neighboring property will be similarly 
restricted, the rationale being that such mutual restriction can 
enhance total community welfare. If the interest of these parties in 
preventing unjustified variance awards for neighboring land is not 
sufficiently protected, the consequence will be subversion of the 
critical reciprocity upon which zoning regulation rests.145 
Thus, although courts normally defer to municipal land use 
decision making because they trust the local political process to 
adequately protect homeowners’ reliance interests, here the court 
deviates from its usual posture of deference and applies vigorous 
judicial review because it lacks the confidence that the zoning board 
will protect those reliance interests. 
 
 142. See, e.g., Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Summers, 814 So. 2d 851, 855 (Ala. 2001) (“We 
have repeatedly recognized that variances should be granted sparingly, and only under unusual 
and exceptional circumstances . . . .”); Valley View Civic Ass’n. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
462 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1983) (“The reasons for granting a variance must be substantial, serious 
and compelling.”). I address further infra in Part III.B.1. the broad distinction courts make 
between legislative and quasi-judicial decision making.  
 143. 522 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1974). 
 144. Id. at 19. 
 145. Id. (citations omitted). 
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Another context in which courts apply heightened judicial 
scrutiny to protect homeowners’ reliance interests from an 
inadequate political process is the extraterritorial impact of 
municipal land use decisions. As we have seen, often a land use 
siting or rezoning will affect property values of nearby homeowners. 
This is what gives homeowners an incentive to lobby city hall to 
prevent unwanted sitings or land use changes. Some of the affected 
homeowners, however, may not actually live in the municipality 
making the land use decision—they may live just across the border 
in a neighboring town. Because voting rights are apportioned based 
on residence, however, these homeowners have no political power 
with which to influence the land use decision.146 Hence, the local 
political process may neglect their reliance interests. Accordingly, 
courts typically hold that municipalities are required to consider the 
interests of such homeowners before making a land use decision.147 
For instance, in Scott v. City of Indian Wells,148 the California Supreme 
Court held that a municipality was required to provide notice and an 
opportunity to be heard regarding the authorization of a new 
development near the municipality’s borders to owners of real 
property situated just outside the borders of a municipality whose 
property values stood to be affected by the proposed development. 
The court held that the landowners in question had a sufficient 
property interest to state a due process claim because “it is clear that 
the development of a parcel on the city’s edge will substantially 
affect the value and usability of an adjacent parcel on the other side 
 
 146. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 38, at 440 (most municipalities accord 
voting rights only to residents). 
 147. See, e.g., Borough of Creskill v. Borough of Dumont, 104 A.2d 441, 445–46 (N.J. 1954) 
(“At the very least Dumont owes a duty to hear any residents and taxpayers of adjoining 
municipalities who may be adversely affected by proposed zoning changes and to give as much 
consideration to their rights as they would to those of residents and taxpayers of Dumont.”); see 
also Brd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. City of Thornton, 629 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1981) (homeowners have 
standing to bring suit against neighboring town challenging land use decision that affects 
plaintiffs’ property values); Allen v. Coffel, 488 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (same); 
Wittingham v. Woodridge, 249 N.E.2d 332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (same); Koppel v. City of 
Fairway, 371 P.2d 113 (Kan. 1962) (same); Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 117 A.2d 86 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1955) (same). I discuss these decisions further infra at note 222. 
 148. 492 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Cal. 1972). 
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of the municipal line.”149 The court’s intervention was necessary 
here because the municipality had no political incentive to consider  
the impacts of its land use decisions on the reliance interests of 
homeowners who lacked voting rights there. 
We can thus fairly conclude that judicial review of land use 
decision making is strongly motivated by a desire to protect 
homeowners’ reliance interests. This explains both why courts 
typically defer to a political process that tends to advantage 
homeowners (despite a doctrinal rule apparently requiring 
heightened judicial review of land use regulation), and why courts 
will occasionally intervene in the political process to protect 
homeowners’ reliance interests where they perceive that the political 
process is inadequate to do so.150 
B. Developers as “Discrete and Insular Minorities” 
Although the foregoing explains why, under the public choice 
model, courts would facilitate a local political process dominated by 
homevoters, the public choice model also cautions courts to be wary 
about such a political process. It has been a staple of public choice 
theory ever since Madison’s famous Federalist No. 10 that small polities 
are subject to capture by self-interested “factions,” which may then 
use their control over the polity to exploit vulnerable minorities for 
their own gain.151 Madison, ever the pragmatist, saw the solution to 
this problem not in eliminating faction itself, but in enlarging the size 
of the jurisdiction so that factions would neutralize each other’s 
influence and no particular faction could persistently dominate the 
political process.152 Madison’s intuition has been confirmed in recent 
decades by political scientists such as Robert Dahl, who have 
demonstrated that urban politics in many large cities does indeed 
 
 149. Id. at 1141. 
 150. I am grateful to Richard Norton for urging me to consider courts’ generally deferential 
posture toward legislation as an alternative explanation of the pattern described in this paper. 
 151. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra 
note 14, at 104–07 (Madison was concerned about majoritarian exploitation in small republics 
such as local governments). 
 152. THE FEDERALIST was, of course, largely a propaganda piece designed to advocate for 
the more centralized form of government created by the new Constitution. 
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follow a pluralist kind of governance model in which shifting 
coalitions form and unform, and “minorities rule.”153 
Ironically, as we have just seen, the very reason why homeowners 
have sought refuge in small suburban municipalities has been to escape 
the interest-group pluralism of diverse cities so that they can exercise 
direct control over their own government without the need to engage in 
messy coalition-forming. These small suburbs, then, are exactly the sort 
of polities Madison was concerned about, in which a stable majority can 
exploit a weaker minority.154 Indeed, Fischel argues that because of 
homeowners’ dominant position within local politics, and their 
motivation to use the political process to prevent most new 
development, developers are placed at a fairly consistent disadvantage in 
the local political process.155 Homeowners tend to be skeptical of most 
new development because they worry that it may entail negative 
impacts such as noise, congestion, traffic, diminution in quality of life, 
and of course, a decline in property values.156 Any given development 
project thus pits “a large and well-organized group of homeowners 
against a single prodevelopment landowner.”157 Assuming the project 
requires some kind of land use approval from the municipality (which it 
virtually always does in an era of ubiquitous land use regulations), the 
developer will face a distinct disadvantage attempting to influence the 
municipal authorities against this large and well-organized adversary. 
Accordingly, Fischel argues that courts should use more vigorous 
judicial review when assessing claims by developers against local 
government land use practices than when assessing claims by 
 
 153. See DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 113, at 133; Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors 
Empower Weak Cities, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2550–55 (2006) (arguing the modern cities are still 
characterized by “significant pluralism”); supra text accompanying notes 112–16.  
 154. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Use Controls as a Problem of 
Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 853–57 (1983) (noting that local governments are 
suspect under Madison’s model). 
 155. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 4–5 (Suburban politics pit “a 
large and well-organized group of existing homeowners against a single prodevelopment 
landowner, who may not even be a resident. . . . [T]he political process is skewed against [the 
developer].”); FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 15–16 (arguing that 
homeowners are the dominant faction in small, suburban communities and use zoning controls 
to protect their own wealth; developers are largely “supplicants”). 
 156. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 4–12, 72–93; sources cited 
supra note 8 (discussing various land use conflicts involving NIMBYs (“Not in my backyard”)). 
 157. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 4–5. 
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homeowners.158 The homeowner, who has political power, can use 
the legislative process to protect her own interests, whereas the 
landowner without such power can only repair to the judiciary. In 
making this case, Fischel draws on a rich body of public choice 
literature that argues, by and large, that courts should use judicial 
review to ensure free and fair access to the political process, and 
should be particularly alert where those aggrieved by a legislative act 
are “discrete and insular minorities” who are vulnerable to 
consistent exploitation by a majoritarian political process.159 Fischel 
argues that developers should be considered the equivalent of a 
discrete and insular minority because they are likely to be 
consistently victimized by antidevelopment homeowners in small 
suburban municipalities. Isolated and voteless, facing off against “a 
large and well-organized group of homeowners,” the developer 
stands little chance of influencing the local political process.160 
To what extent have the courts taken this public choice critique 
to heart? As noted earlier, courts are undoubtedly aware of the fact 
that the local political process in many communities is controlled by 
homeowners. We have seen, though, that courts nevertheless tend to 
be highly deferential to local land use decision making. In some 
circumstances, however, courts do recognize that developers are 
likely to be vulnerable in local politics and will depart from their 
usual deferential standard in order to protect developers against 
majoritarian exploitation. For instance, as Part III.B.1 below 
demonstrates, some courts have protected developers by applying 
heightened scrutiny to certain land use regulations, labeled “quasi-
judicial” or “adjudicative,” that disproportionately impact particular 
landowners, while acknowledging that broad deference is 
appropriate for “legislative” acts that impact the public more 
generally. This distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial acts 
 
 158. See id. at 4–5, 114–40. 
 159. See id. at 114–40. Fischel draws on classic works such as JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–179 (1980) and Frank I. Michelman, Property, 
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1165, 1217–18 (1967). See supra notes 64 & 80 (discussing these sources). 
 160. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 136–37 (discussing how 
majoritarian political process, such as that present in small suburban communities, gives rise to 
suspicion of exploitation of discrete and insular minorities much more readily than in a 
“pluralistic” political process). 
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appears to reflect the public choice logic that courts should more 
closely review regulations that affect isolated, disorganized groups 
than those that affect larger, well-organized groups. 
Ultimately, however, most courts have declined to apply the 
“quasi-judicial” label broadly so as to protect developers against a 
majoritarian political process. While this may appear to show that 
courts do not follow a public choice understanding of the political 
process, in Part III.B.2 I argue that courts’ rejection of a broad use of 
the quasi-judicial standard is actually quite consistent with the 
public choice account. Under that account, heightened scrutiny for 
adjudicative decisions is largely unnecessary to protect developers 
because developers can prevent majoritarian exploitation to the 
extent they can simply exit one jurisdiction and seek a friendly 
regulatory environment elsewhere—an ability made all the easier by 
the proliferation of small municipalities within particular 
metropolitan areas. Thus, while developers do not require the 
heightened protections of a quasi-judicial proceeding, they do require 
protection in circumstances where they cannot easily exit a 
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, exiting a jurisdiction should be easy, because 
developers usually have the ability to diversify their risk across 
numerous projects in different jurisdictions. However, once a 
developer has sunk substantial resources into a particular project, 
exit becomes very costly. Thus, courts will intervene to protect a 
developer under circumstances where she has demonstrated 
significant reliance interests. Once again, reliance proves to be a 
central concern in judicial review of municipal land use regulations. 
1. The legislative/quasi-judicial distinction: protection for developers? 
A long-standing doctrine of administrative law holds that courts 
should defer to “legislative” acts that broadly affect the public at 
large, but apply stricter scrutiny to “quasi-judicial” acts that 
disproportionately affect particular individuals.161 As Saul Levmore 
notes, the heightened scrutiny for quasi-judicial as opposed to 
 
 161. Compare Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (requiring notice and 
opportunity to be heard where administrative process disproportionately affected few 
landowners) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) 
(dispensing with requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard where administrative action 
affected the public generally).  
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legislative matters reflects the underlying public choice logic 
discussed here.162 Specifically, where regulation disproportionately 
harms an isolated individual or small group, the affected party is 
unlikely to be capable of organizing to influence the political process 
so as to obtain relief from the regulation; by contrast, when 
regulation broadly impacts a larger class, that class can more easily 
organize into an interest group and influence the political process so 
as to protect itself against the harmful regulation. Therefore, 
consistent with the public choice view of judicial review, courts 
apply greater scrutiny to the former kind of regulation than the 
latter.163 Levmore notes that the divide between quasi-judicial and 
legislative acts closely resembles the divide in takings law between a 
physical occupation and a regulation that broadly affects property 
values (recall the condemnation blight scenario discussed in the 
Lucas case).164 Because a physical occupation is more likely to affect 
isolated, individual landowners who are politically powerless, 
whereas a regulation tends to affect a large group that is capable of 
organizing, the former is considered a compensable taking while the 
latter is not. Levmore argues accordingly that the courts are more 
concerned with group size and organizational ability than with 
reliance per se.165 
On the surface, there is some evidence to support Levmore’s 
view. Historically, most land use decisions were considered 
legislative in character unless they were plainly individualized 
administrative matters, such as an application for a variance or a 
special use permit. In the early 1970s, however, a number of courts 
undertook to broaden the scope of the “quasi-judicial” label to cover 
matters such as small-scale rezoning requests.166 One of the more 
 
 162. See Levmore, supra note 14, at 307 & n.51. 
 163. Id. Carol Rose likewise argues that the application of the quasi-judicial standard to 
municipal land use decisions reflects the traditional Madisonian concern that a majority 
“faction” may exploit vulnerable minorities. See Rose, supra note 154, at 851–57. 
 164. See Levmore, supra note 14, at 307 & n.51. 
 165. Levmore explicitly rejects that the Court’s takings jurisprudence centers on the 
protection of reliance interests. See id. at 317–18 & n.74. He argues that takings law is more 
fruitfully explained by the distinction between larger, well-organized groups and smaller, 
isolated groups. See id. 
 166. This approach has come to be known as the “Fasano doctrine,” after Fasano v. Bd. of 
Cnty. Commissioners, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973), the leading case applying the quasi-judicial 
standard to small-scale rezonings. 
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notable cases to take this approach, Snyder v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Brevard County,167 argued that it was necessary to 
treat small-scale rezonings as quasi-judicial in order to protect the 
isolated developers who typically seek such relief from a political 
process controlled by organized homeowners who are predisposed to 
oppose rezoning requests. In Snyder, a developer sought to have a 
one-half acre parcel rezoned from General Use (a very low-density 
zoning classification) to a medium-density, multi-family dwelling 
classification so that he could erect multi-family housing on the 
parcel.168 The proposed rezoning was not anticipated to cause any 
significant environmental impacts and was consistent with the 
county’s comprehensive plan, and as such the county’s appointed 
Planning and Zoning Board recommended that the rezoning be 
approved.169 Nevertheless, the elected county Board of 
Commissioners overruled the Planning and Zoning Board and denied 
the rezoning, without providing any reasons for its decision.170 The 
court held that this sort of small-scale rezoning was quasi-judicial in 
character and thus required the Board to state reasons for its 
decisions and make findings of fact that would facilitate close judicial 
scrutiny.171 
The court determined that applying these quasi-judicial 
standards was necessary in order to protect developers against a 
political process stacked in favor of anti-development homeowners. 
The court noted that rezoning decisions are often made based “not 
solely on the basis of the land’s suitability to the new zoning 
classification and compatibility with the use of surrounding acreage, 
but, also, and perhaps foremost, on local political considerations.”172 
Chief among the relevant “local political considerations,” the court 
observed, was the desire of existing homeowners to maintain the 
value of their own land by preventing new development.173 Because 
homeowners’ political opposition interferes with a developer’s 
“constitutional right to use his vacant property or make a more 
 
 167. Snyder v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Brevard, 595 So. 2d 65 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
rev’d in part, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993). 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. at 67. 
 170. See id. at 67–68. 
 171. See id. at 78–82. 
 172. Id. at 73. 
 173. See id. at 73–74. 
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intense use of his underzoned land,”174 the court held that the 
developer was entitled to the protections of a quasi-judicial 
proceeding before his request for a rezoning could be denied. 
Snyder appears to affirm Levmore’s view that the judicial process 
appropriately focuses not on reliance per se, but more broadly on 
circumstances in which an isolated individual or group is likely to be 
exploited by well-organized interests.175 In Snyder, indeed, there was 
no evidence that the plaintiff developer had any protectable reliance 
interests—he had purchased the parcel in question while it was 
zoned for a restrictive zoning classification in which his proposed 
development was prohibited, and there is nothing in the record to 
suggest that he had received any assurances that his request for a 
site-specific rezoning would be granted. 
Snyder, however, is an outlier. Most courts resist treating site-
specific rezonings as quasi-judicial, opting instead to treat almost all 
rezonings as legislative in character.176 In many of these cases, 
courts explicitly acknowledge the political dominance of 
homeowners in the local political process and the isolation of the 
individual developer, but nevertheless hold that homeowners are 
entitled to use the political process to their advantage regardless of 
the impact on the isolated developer.177 The most glaring 
counterpoint to Snyder, though involving owners of commercial 
property rather than homeowners, is Coniston Corp. v. Village of 
Hoffman Estates.178 As discussed previously, Coniston upheld a local 
government’s refusal to approve a site plan for development of a 
 
 174. Id. at 73. 
 175. A somewhat similar case is Kennedy v. Upper Milford Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 834 
A.2d 1104 (Pa. 2003). There, the court held that the local zoning hearing board did not violate 
state “Sunshine Laws” by deliberating privately regarding a developer’s application for a variance 
that would permit raising the height of a cell phone tower. The court reasoned that the zoning 
hearing board was a quasi-adjudicative body and, as such, private deliberations were appropriate 
in order to ensure that the board was insulated from the “emotional rancor” that often 
surrounds such decision. See id. at 1117. 
 176. See, e.g., Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 21 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2001); Arnel v. City 
of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980); SELMI ET AL., supra note 15, at 267 (“Most states . . . 
have rejected the Fasano doctrine and continue to treat all rezonings as legislative in nature.”). 
 177. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 48 F.3d 810, 828–29 (4th Cir. 1995) (denying 
request for site-specific rezoning appropriately based on political pressure from homeowners 
who opposed rezoning; stating that “[i]t is not pernicious per se for a zoning authority to be 
influenced by political pressure in the community”); see also cases cited supra note 108. 
 178. 844 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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small tract of land, even after acknowledging that the decision could 
plausibly be described as “an effort to transfer wealth from the 
plaintiffs” to existing landowners by protecting landowners from 
competition by the plaintiffs.179 Parenthetically, the court took note 
of the public choice view that the legislative/quasi-judicial 
distinction hinges on the size of the affected class, and stated that 
“[t]he class here is small. This might support an argument that some 
type of individualized hearing was required.”180 Nevertheless, the 
court shrugged off this argument and held that the action was 
legislative in character, stating that “the check on [the legislative 
authority’s] behavior is purely electoral, but . . . in a democratic 
polity this method of checking official action cannot be dismissed as 
inadequate per se.”181  
Several other courts have followed Coniston’s lead and refused to 
apply heightened scrutiny in cases where developers have lost out in 
the political process as a result of the apparent dominance of 
homevoters.182 Moreover, as we have seen before, many courts who 
do apply heightened scrutiny to individualized land use decisions are 
motivated by exactly the opposite concern that drove Snyder: they 
worry that where individualized as opposed to broadly applicable 
land use regulations are involved, the developer is likely to have too 
much influence with regulatory authorities.183 For these courts, 
heightened scrutiny of individualized land use decisions is necessary 
to protect homeowners—and specifically homeowners’ reliance 
interests—from an antidemocratic decision-making process that 
disregards their interests. These cases support my argument that 
what is really driving the judiciary is not a stylized distinction 
between large, organized groups and isolated, individual landowners, 
 
 179. Id. at 467.  
 180. Id. at 469. 
 181. Id.  
 182. See cases cited supra note 108. 
 183. See supra text accompanying notes 140–50; see also Fasano v. Bd. of Cnty. 
Commisioners, 507 P.2d 23, 30 (Or. 1973) (holding that developer’s request for small-scale 
rezoning must be considered quasi-judicial because of the “dangers of the almost irresistible 
pressures that can be asserted by private economic interests on local government”). Although 
Fasano was significantly revised, and arguably overruled, by the subsequent case of Neuberger v. 
City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980), it was later cited as persuasive authority by Snyder, 
even though its view about the relative power of developers in the local political process is 
precisely the opposite of Snyder’s. 
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as Levmore suggests, but rather the desire to protect reliance 
interests where the political process is inadequate to protect those 
interests. I pursue that theme further in the following section. 
2. The Tiebout model and the significance of reliance 
Given the courts’ general refusal to provide isolated developers 
with heightened judicial protection against a local political process 
dominated by homeowners, can we conclude that courts are 
insensitive to the public choice model of local government and 
unconcerned about the exploitation of “discrete and insular” 
minorities by a majoritarian faction? Not necessarily. Public choice 
theorists have long noted that there is a built-in safety valve against 
majoritarian exploitation of minority interests in small local 
governments: the ability of exploited minorities to simply flee the 
jurisdiction. Ever since a path breaking article in 1956 by economist 
Charles Tiebout,184 it has been a staple of public choice theory that 
where a given metropolitan region features a critical mass of local 
governments, individuals possess the ability to “vote with their feet” 
by choosing to locate in the jurisdiction they find most attractive.185 
Empirical studies have largely confirmed that such foot-voting does 
indeed take place.186 The mobility of urban constituents works to 
discipline local governments: if municipalities choose to adopt 
policies such as redistributive taxes or oppressive land use policies, 
they pay for that mistake by losing their markets.187 Thus, the threat 
of exit is a counterpoint to the Madisonian problem of majoritarian 
exploitation: where a jurisdiction is very small, it may indeed enable 
a particular faction to dominate, but small jurisdiction size will also 
tend to make exit relatively easy, provided that there is a catholicity 
 
 184. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956). 
 185. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 506–28 (1991) (reviewing public 
choice model and evidence supporting it); Rose, supra note 154, at 882–87 (arguing that 
possibility of exit is a means of legitimizing local government).  
 186. See Been, supra note 185, at 506–28 (reviewing evidence). 
 187. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 277 (“The chief discipline on 
local government majoritarianism is mobility.”); Been, supra note 185, at 506–28 (indicating that 
Tiebout model suggests that competition among jurisdictions for mobile residents and revenue 
will constrain opportunistic behavior by government officials). 
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of other small jurisdictions in the same metropolitan region.188 
Those who have “chosen” to stay in a particular jurisdiction with 
exploitative regulations by not exiting have presumptively consented 
to be governed by those regulations, and thus courts need not 
intervene.189 
The “Tiebout model” suggests, accordingly, that judicial review 
of municipal land use regulations should largely be confined to 
circumstances where a party is incapable of exiting a jurisdiction 
except at great cost. Ordinarily, as just mentioned, the implicit threat 
of exit is sufficient to prevent local governments from exploiting 
discrete and insular minorities. Once that threat is removed, 
however, local governments have a free hand to take advantage of 
vulnerable parties. 
This, at long last, explains why courts are so solicitous of 
developers’ reliance interests. Where a developer has invested little 
in a particular project, exit is relatively cheap. Many developers, of 
course, are not residents or stakeholders of any particular 
community but simply businesspeople who will locate in whatever 
municipality offers the best return on their investment.190 Thus, if a 
developer has optioned a piece of real property in a particular 
municipality with the intent to develop it, and the municipality 
subsequently makes clear that the approval process is going to be a 
difficult one, the developer can abandon the investment with nothing 
lost beyond the price of the option.191 Furthermore, a developer may 
invest simultaneously in numerous projects in different jurisdictions 
in order to hedge against the possibility of an unfavorable regulatory 
environment in any particular municipality. Given all this, municipal 
authorities are likely to refrain from placing overly burdensome 
regulatory hurdles upon the developer precisely because they are 
aware of how easily the developer can leave town. However, once a 
developer has begun making substantial investments in a specific 
project, the cost of exit rises dramatically. The municipality now has 
 
 188. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 289–324 (arguing that threat of 
exit can prevent exploitation of “discrete and insular” minorities). 
 189. See id. at 277 (judicial intervention unnecessary where mobility is easy). 
 190. Cf. Been, supra note 185, at 509–11 (discussing numerous options developer can 
exercise when dissatisfied with municipal regulatory regime). 
 191. See id. at 511–13 (noting widespread municipal awareness of developers’ ability to 
option land and thus to easily exit jurisdiction). 
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less of an incentive to maintain a favorable regulatory environment 
for the developer. In addition, the implicit logic of the Tiebout 
model—that a party has constructively consented to a jurisdiction’s 
oppressive regulations by choosing to do business there—is 
undermined if the oppressive regulations are not actually in place at 
the time the developer opts to plant firm roots in the jurisdiction, 
but are only adopted after the developer’s exit costs have dramatically 
increased. The Tiebout model presupposes that regulation will be 
reasonably transparent and predictable so that parties can make an 
informed decision to vote with their feet.192 Thus, if the Tiebout 
model is accepted, it makes sense that courts would seek to protect 
developers’ reliance interests in circumstances where their exit costs 
are sufficiently high that they cannot readily escape majoritarian 
exploitation.193 
This observation returns us to our starting point: why do courts 
protect developers’ reliance interests and not those of homeowners? 
After all, the homeowner has the same problem as the developer 
with the sunk costs: she has invested so much in a single asset in 
 
 192. See Rose, supra note 154, at 903–10 (arguing that “exit model” requires 
predictability). 
 193. Vicki Been argues that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence restricting the ability of 
municipalities to extract concessions from developers in exchange for regulatory permits (the 
“exactions” jurisprudence) is inconsistent with the Tiebout exit model because the Court 
presumes that developers seeking regulatory permits are vulnerable to “extortion” by 
municipalities with a monopoly on the permitting power. Been, supra note 185; see Koontz v. St. 
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 
(1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). According to Been, developers are 
not vulnerable to extortion where municipalities must be sensitive to interlocal competition and 
are presumptively aware of the ease with which developers can forego an investment 
opportunity in one locality for a better opportunity in a neighboring town. See Been, supra note 
185. Nevertheless, these cases need not necessarily be read as inconsistent with the Tiebout 
model. The earlier two cases, Nollan and Dolan, involved landowners who were not developers 
but merely wanted to expand the existing use of their property. Arguably, then, their reliance 
interests and exit costs were high. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 344–45 
(arguing that Nollan implicated landowner’s reliance interests). The recently decided Koontz case 
is harder to square with the Tiebout model because it involved a developer who wanted to build 
on vacant land and the record revealed no evidence of any significant reliance interests. 
However, as Justice Kagan noted in dissent, Koontz leaves open the question of whether it 
applies only to exactions imposed on an ad hoc basis or if it also includes exactions that are 
generally applicable. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Ehrlich v. Culver 
City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996)). As ad hoc exactions would make the issuance of regulatory 
permits unpredictable, whereas generally applicable exactions afford predictability to developers, 
subjecting the former but not the latter to the exactions doctrine would respect developers’ 
reliance interests. It remains to be seen what the long-term implications of Koontz will be. 
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reliance on the pre-existing zoning that exiting the jurisdiction after 
an adverse zoning change can only be accomplished at great expense 
(loss of equity, depreciated credit rating, and a possible deficiency 
judgment). There is a crucial difference, however, between 
developers and homeowners. As just explained, the high cost of exit 
caused by the incurrence of substantial reliance interests renders 
developers exceptionally vulnerable in the local political process. But 
the difficulty of exiting is precisely what enables homeowners to be 
so dominant within that political process. As we have already seen, 
homeowners’ stake in the outcome of land use decisions gives them 
a strong incentive to organize and influence local government, 
because they do not have the freedom to simply exit when they 
dislike the regulatory regime.194 Indeed, we recall that one of the 
central reasons why the federal government has sought to incentivize 
homeownership over the past century has been to induce Americans 
to be politically active by giving them a stake in governmental 
affairs.195 Studies have confirmed that homeowners tend to be far 
more active in local politics than renters, likely because homeowners 
face much greater barriers to exit that force them to exercise their 
voice in local government.196 
Thus, the fact that reliance makes exit difficult provides a public 
choice explanation for both why developers are likely to be exploited 
in the local political process and why homeowners/neighbors are 
likely to be dominant in that same process, which likewise explains 
why courts generally provide judicial protection for developers’ 
reliance interests while declining to provide similar protection for 
neighbors’ reliance interests. In conclusion, it appears that reliance is 
 
 194. See supra text accompanying notes 89–94. Drawing on Albert Hirschmann’s path 
breaking work EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970), Fischel, Rose, and other theorists argue that 
one alternative to exit is staying within the municipality and exercising one’s “voice.” See 
FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 72–76; FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra 
note 14, at 289–324; Rose, supra note 154, at 883–87. Indeed, according to Fischel, it is precisely 
the inability to exit that requires homeowners to stay “loyal” and exercise their “voice.” See 
FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 72–76. 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 51–52. Rose mentions that lighting out to the 
frontier is a long-standing American tradition that legitimizes the notion of exit. See Rose, supra 
note 154, at 886. As I have mentioned supra, however, there is an equally strong tradition of 
encouraging Americans to plant firm roots in their communities, perhaps apotheosized by the 
efforts of policymakers like Herbert Hoover to encourage homeownership. This tension between 
“exit” and “voice” provides much of the underlying dynamics of local land use decision making.  
 196. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 80–81. 
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at the core of the judicial approach to the land use decision making 
process. The primacy of reliance interests explains courts’ general 
policy of deferring to municipal land use regulations and state 
policies regarding municipal boundary change, their rejection of 
heightened procedural protections for developers in most 
circumstances where some evidence of reliance is not present, and 
their solicitude for developers’ reliance interests where developers 
have made substantial expenditures based on some site-specific 
regulation.197 
In the remaining Part, I offer two critiques of the public choice 
account. The first assails its descriptive premise about homeowner 
control of the local political process, arguing that in fact the local 
political process is far more complex than the public choice account 
admits. The second, more fundamental critique is normative in 
nature. The public choice account so fetishizes reliance interests that 
it fails to give sufficient regard to equally weighty interests in land 
use decision making. In the ultimate analysis, furthermore, the 
lionization of reliance interests proves self-defeating even on its own 
terms. 
IV. CRITIQUING THE PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL 
A. Descriptive Critique: What About Big Cities? 
A major presumption of the public choice account, of course, is 
that homeowners represent the dominant faction in local politics and 
that developers therefore constitute a vulnerable, isolated minority. 
 
 197. As I have argued here that courts are driven by a public choice understanding of how 
municipalities operate, I should note that there is also a public choice theory of how courts 
operate. Einer Elhauge argues, for example, that courts, like legislatures, are likely to be overly 
influenced by parties who can most effectively organize, because organization enables effective 
litigation efforts just as it does effective lobbying efforts. See Elhauge, supra note 90, at 66–71. It 
is not clear how much this matters in the context of land use litigation, however, which Elhauge 
does not discuss specifically. What tends to give homeowners the advantage in most small, 
suburban municipalities is not natural organizing ability but a political process in which 
homeowners are the dominant faction. I argue below that in larger, more diverse municipalities, 
developers are likely to be more influential because of their deep pockets and repeat-player 
advantages. These factors would seemingly give developers significant influence in the litigation 
process as well, but that influence may be counteracted by the ability of the municipalities 
defending land use restrictions to call upon the support of powerful and well-funded 
associations of municipal governments who seek to avoid an adverse precedent. I thank David 
Schleicher for directing me to consider the public choice theory of litigation. 
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However, as we have already seen, this premise is generally only true 
of small suburban municipalities, not larger cities. Larger cities are 
believed to follow a “pluralist” model of governance in which 
developers exercise a considerable degree of political influence and 
homeowners are less powerful.198 Indeed, many theorists argue that 
cities are actually beholden to a “growth machine” that seeks to 
pursue heedless development regardless of the consequences to 
existing homeowners.199 It is for this reason, as we have seen, that 
many homeowners have fled big cities and lighted out to smaller 
“majoritarian” municipalities in which they can call the shots.200 
This observation suggests that courts should reverse their 
traditional approach when dealing with large cities: provide less 
judicial protection for developers and more protection for 
homeowners.201 The courts, however, have taken a one-size-fits-all 
 
 198. See supra text accompanying notes 112–16. 
 199. See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 11, at 50–98 (articulating growth machine thesis). 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 117–31. In recent years, some scholars have 
challenged the “growth machine” thesis. David Schleicher, for example, argues that the political 
structuring of most big cities actually favors NIMBY homeowners who desire to prevent new 
growth. Specifically, Schleicher argues that the formally nonpartisan nature of local elections 
disables city councils from forming alliances based on party allegiance, and thus councils simply 
defer to individual councilmembers to decide issues pertinent to the geographic districts they 
represent. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 Yale L.J. 1670, 1703, 1709–10 (2013). And 
because development brings diffuse citywide benefits while concentrating costs in one 
geographic area, councilmembers are predisposed to oppose new development in their own 
wards. See id. To the extent this is a general argument about how cities function, I find it 
unconvincing. Schleicher’s theory presupposes that city councils are all ward-based systems in 
which councilmembers represent specific geographic districts. This may be true of older, rustbelt 
cities, but most cities today, especially in the fast-growing Sunbelt, feature “at-large” electoral 
systems in which councilmembers do not represent individual geographic districts but are 
elected citywide. See ROBERT E. LANG & JENNIFER B. LEFURGY, BOOMBURBS: THE RISE OF 
AMERICA’S ACCIDENTAL CITIES 121–24 (2007) (reporting that virtually all of the large and 
increasingly diverse suburban cities in the Sunbelt, dubbed “boomburbs” by the authors, use at-
large voting systems); JAMES H. SVARA, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, A SURVEY OF AMERICA’S CITY 
COUNCILS 25 (1991) (reporting that nationwide, 42.6% of cities use at-large elections, 29.1% use 
district elections, and the remaining 28.2% use mixed systems in which some seats are elected 
by district and others at-large). In these cities, the growth machine appears to still be 
predominant. See generally LANG & LEFURGY, supra, at 123–24 (arguing that the “growth 
machine” is dominant in boomburb municipalities). For a discussion of the consequences of at-
large voting structures on land use conflicts in the southwest, see Kenneth A. Stahl, The Artifice 
of Local Growth Politics: At-Large Elections, Ballot-Box Zoning, and Judicial Review, 94 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1 (2010). 
 201. Cf. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 328 (advocating more judicial 
deference to land use decisions in large cities because of pluralistic decision making process). 
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approach to local governments that treats all general-purpose 
municipalities as formally equivalent, regardless of size or diversity. 
Courts have given no indication that the nature of judicial review is 
contingent upon whether a particular municipality has a “pluralist” 
or “majoritarian” political process. Perhaps courts believe they lack 
the institutional competence to make the fine distinction between 
“pluralism” and “majoritarianism,” or they desire to avoid the 
administrative difficulties of applying these labels on an ad hoc basis. 
It is understandable that courts would decline to engage in amateur 
political science, but if they do so, we cannot then rest a theory of 
judicial review on blanket assumptions about what groups are likely 
to exploit or be exploited in local politics. In short, the public choice 
model rests on a questionable empirical premise that courts are 
unwilling to question.  
B. Normative Critique: Reliance Distorts Land Use Decision Making 
The normative problem with the public choice account is that 
the courts’ single-minded focus on the protection of reliance 
interests causes important competing concerns to be shortchanged 
in the land use decision making process. Under the public choice 
model, existing residents have an enormous incentive to either keep 
out most new housing or to drastically increase the cost of new 
housing through burdensome regulatory hurdles.202 This means 
that, for the sake of protecting existing residents’ reliance interests, 
prospective residents of these communities will either be wholly 
excluded or forced to pay a steep admission fee in order to settle 
there. As I demonstrate below, this simple dichotomy between 
existing and prospective residents has been a major contributor to 
racial and income segregation in most metropolitan regions.203 
 
 202. See, e.g., FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 4–12, 72–93; Richard 
Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1824, 1829 (2003) (explaining how 
homeowner-dominated jurisdictions use zoning to restrict the supply of housing so as to 
increase their own property values).  
 203. There are other equally significant costs to the courts’ fetishization of reliance 
interests. For instance, it can cause inefficiencies in land use sitings, because homeowners’ 
resistance to land uses such as multi-family housing, gas stations, or waste facilities makes it 
difficult to find suitable sites for these regionally necessary but locally undesirable land uses 
(often called LULUS). See, e.g., Been, supra note 185, at 788–90 (“The siting of LULUs . . . has 
become an extraordinarily difficult public policy challenge.”). Likewise, giving so much weight to 
homeowners’ reliance interests can promote wasteful urban sprawl, because developers can only 
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Courts have sidestepped this problem, however, by simply denying 
the causal relationship between reliance interests and segregation. In 
doing so, however, they have tipped their hand that the entire 
judicial enterprise of protecting reliance interests is fruitless. 
1. Prospective vs. existing residents and the problem of interlocal segregation 
When courts have directly confronted the conflict between 
existing residents’ reliance interests and prospective residents’ 
demand for affordable housing, they have unabashedly sided with 
the former by invoking the underlying premises of the public choice 
model. In Nordlinger v. Hahn,204 for example, the Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 13, a 
controversial ballot initiative that imposes strict limits on property 
tax assessments for existing landowners but lifts those restrictions 
upon a change in ownership. As the Court noted, Proposition 13 is 
widely described as embracing a “Welcome, stranger” model in 
which newer homeowners are expected to bear a much greater 
proportion of the costs of local government than existing 
homeowners with similar homes.205 Indeed, the petitioner in the 
case, who purchased her home in 1988, alleged that she paid five 
times more in property taxes than her neighbors, who had owned 
comparable houses in the same neighborhood since 1975.206 As the 
only basis for this disparity was the date of home purchase, the 
petitioner claimed that the initiative arbitrarily distinguished 
between newer and existing residents in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.207 
The Court held, however, that there was a reasonable basis for 
this distinction—reliance interests. As the Court stated: 
[A]n existing owner rationally may be thought to have vested 
expectations in his property or home that are more deserving of 
 
satisfy the pent-up demand for housing by leap-frogging existing suburban communities for 
pristine exurban greenfields. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in 
Metropolitan Areas, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1115, 1133–41 (1996) [hereinafter Briffault, The Local 
Government Boundary Problem]. I focus my attention here on interlocal segregation because I think 
it is sufficient to make the point that courts’ solicitude for reliance interests is misplaced.  
 204. 505 U.S. 1 (1992). 
 205. See id. at 6. 
 206. See id. at 6–7. 
 207. See id. 
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protection than the anticipatory expectations of a new owner at the 
point of purchase. A new owner has full information about the 
scope of future tax liability before acquiring the property, and if he 
thinks the future tax burden is too demanding, he can decide not to 
complete the purchase at all. By contrast, the existing owner, 
already saddled with his purchase, does not have the option of 
deciding not to buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high.208 
The Court’s reasoning directly reflects the Tieboutian logic of the 
public choice model. According to that model, as we have seen, 
those who have no reliance interests in a particular parcel retain the 
freedom to “vote with their feet” and choose where to locate, 
whereas those who have established reliance interests face much 
higher exit costs and are thus essentially stuck with the regulatory 
policies of their existing jurisdiction. Accordingly, policymakers may 
legitimately favor the latter as against the former. 
While Nordlinger dealt with the property tax, its logic makes 
practically unassailable any municipal policy that favors existing 
residents at the expense of prospective residents. It is commonplace 
for municipalities to protect homeowners’ reliance interests by 
placing drastic restrictions on new housing, which will necessarily 
make housing for prospective residents either unavailable or 
extremely expensive.209 Homeowners are particularly adverse to new 
multi-family or affordable housing because of the anticipated 
impacts of such housing on property values and property taxes.210 
Zoning laws that restrict the availability of affordable housing are 
often referred to as “exclusionary zoning” laws because their impact, 
if not their intent, is to exclude those in need of affordable 
housing.211 Under Nordlinger’s logic, however, exclusionary zoning 
policies are immune from assault because prospective residents can 
presumably locate elsewhere if the costs of entrance to a particular 
 
 208. Id. at 12–13. 
 209. See sources cited supra notes 8, 202. 
 210. See Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 203, at 1133–41 
(discussing political economy that causes suburban municipalities to exclude undesirable uses 
like affordable housing); Schragger, supra note 202, at 1834–52 (2003) (critiquing political 
economy of the suburbs in which homeowners have incentives to exclude undesirable uses such 
as affordable housing). 
 211. The literature on exclusionary zoning is voluminous, but for excellent short 
discussions, see Schragger, supra note 202; J. Peter Byrne, Are Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 Geo. 
L. J. 2265 (2000). 
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municipality are too high, whereas existing homeowners are already 
locked into their investment. 
There is reason to doubt Nordlinger’s presumption, however. 
Most metropolitan regions today feature dozens of suburban 
communities that all maintain substantially similar exclusionary 
zoning regimes; the cumulative effect is a pattern of de facto 
segregation in which small, affluent, largely white suburbs are able 
to maintain their exclusivity with zoning barriers, while the poor, 
often minority individuals excluded thereby are shepherded into 
deteriorating urban ghettos.212 The reality of ghettoization belies the 
premise of the public choice model that prospective suburban 
residents have the ability to vote with their feet: inner-city residents 
have no effective ability to exit because the surrounding suburban 
communities have all erected fairly uniform zoning barriers against 
entry. 
Nevertheless, even in cases where the severe class and racial 
impacts of exclusionary zoning practices have been evident, the 
reliance interests of existing homeowners have provided a sturdy 
defense for such practices. An exemplar of this trend is Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,213 one of 
the rare cases in which the Supreme Court has considered the 
constitutionality of a suburban exclusionary zoning ordinance. In 
this case, the village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, a suburb of 
Chicago, was zoned almost entirely for single-family homes. Census 
reports revealed that of 64,000 residents of the village, only twenty-
seven were black. A developer proposed to build low-income 
housing on a parcel of land in a neighborhood zoned exclusively for 
single-family homes, and therefore requested that the parcel be 
rezoned from a single-family residential classification to multi-family 
residential. The city council refused to authorize the rezoning, after a 
series of public meetings at which city residents expressed their 
opposition to the project. According to the Court, opponents of the 
project argued that “the area always had been zoned single-family, 
and the neighboring citizens had built or purchased there in reliance 
 
 212. See generally MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 1–78 (1976) (on the 
relationship between suburban zoning and urban ghettoization); Schragger, supra note 202, at 
1838 (“The current extreme segregation of American metropolitan regions owes a great deal to 
the power of localities to restrict in-migrants based on income.”).  
 213. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
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on that classification. Rezoning threatened to cause a measurable 
drop in property value for neighboring sites.”214 The Court held that 
the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the village’s refusal to rezone 
was the result of intentional discrimination (required to establish a 
Fourteenth Amendment violation) because “[t]here is no reason to 
doubt that there has been reliance by some neighboring property 
owners on the maintenance of single-family zoning in the 
vicinity.”215 Arlington Heights, like Nordlinger, thus stands for the 
proposition that the protection of reliance interests is a perfectly 
reasonable basis for favoring existing residents at the expense of 
non-residents, even where the result is a massively disproportionate 
impact on racial minorities. 
Although the sanctification of reliance interests in Nordlinger and 
Arlington Heights is superficially consistent with the public choice 
model, these decisions are also troubling from the public choice 
perspective because they seem rather insensitive to the plight of 
“discrete and insular minorities.” As we have seen, one of the central 
concerns of the public choice model is to protect the interests of 
isolated minorities who may be subject to exploitation by 
majoritarian factions. Fischel, for example, argues that developers 
should be considered the equivalent of a discrete and insular 
minority because, given the dominance of homeowners in the local 
political process and their antipathy toward new development, 
developers are unlikely to be influential with municipal 
authorities.216 By this logic, the primarily low-income minority 
populations that are consigned to living in poorer central cities by 
zoning decisions such as the one validated in Arlington Heights are the 
quintessential discrete and insular minorities. While homevoters are 
often opposed to all new development, they are most adamantly 
opposed to new affordable housing, which promises not only to 
dramatically increase the overall housing supply and thus lower 
property values, but also to increase the demand for additional 
municipal services, which will ultimately require higher property 
taxes.217 At the same time, the poor, primarily minority individuals 
 
 214. Id. at 258. 
 215. Id. at 270. 
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 151–60. 
 217. See Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 203, at 1133–41 
(discussing political economy that causes suburban municipalities to exclude undesirable uses 
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who desire to live in suburban municipalities are the classic 
politically isolated “outsiders” who, not being residents of the 
communities in which they seek to live, have no voting power 
there—indeed, the very gravamen of the complaint in Arlington 
Heights is that the plaintiffs were excluded from living in the village. 
Yet, cases like Arlington Heights and public choice theorists like 
Fischel appear untroubled by the exclusion of minorities from 
suburban communities.218 
The Court and the public choice theorists have managed to avoid 
confronting this dilemma with a simple but revealing logic: they 
treat each municipality as a fully self-contained entity that has no 
impacts outside its own borders. As the effects of local land use 
policy are, by assumption, totally encapsulated within the 
municipality itself, the local political process simply need not 
concern itself with the interests of prospective residents, who can 
easily choose to locate in a neighboring jurisdiction if they dislike 
one community’s policies. 
The Court’s decision in Arlington Heights, for example, 
conceptualizes the village as if it were an isolated island rather than a 
tiny fragment of a large metropolitan region. The opinion trains its 
focus on a single zoning decision by this lone municipality—the 
village’s refusal to rezone a parcel of land to enable a developer to 
build low-income housing—and, finding nothing amiss with that 
isolated zoning decision, holds that there is no constitutional 
problem. Absent from the decision is any of the broader context in 
which the rezoning decision took place, such as the village’s long-
standing pattern of exclusionary zoning that resulted in the village 
being almost entirely devoid of minorities, or the fact that the sort of 
exclusionary zoning practices challenged in the case were so 
widespread in the Chicago area and throughout the country as to 
create a nationwide pattern of interlocal segregation.219 
 
like affordable housing); Schragger, supra note 202, at 1834–52 (critiquing political economy of 
the suburbs in which homeowners have incentives to exclude undesirable uses such as 
affordable housing). 
 218. Rick Schragger’s incisive critique of Fischel’s THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS notes: 
“[T]he book’s most glaring omission is any sustained treatment of race as a component of the 
homevoter’s political economy.” Schragger, supra note 202, at 1836. 
 219. Arlington Heights’ polar opposite in this regard is Southern Burlington County NAACP v. 
Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that the exclusionary impact of suburban zoning ordinances on minorities was sufficient to 
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In other decisions, the Court has more explicitly considered local 
governments to be autonomous entities whose decisions have no 
impacts beyond their borders. In Warth v. Seldin,220 an important 
precursor case to Arlington Heights, a group of plaintiffs identifying 
themselves as residents or taxpayers of the city of Rochester, New 
York, challenged the assertedly exclusionary zoning practices of a 
neighboring suburban community called Penfield. They claimed that 
Penfield’s zoning practices directly affected them insofar as 
Rochester was forced to absorb the need for affordable housing that 
Penfield refused to accommodate at considerable cost to Rochester’s 
own taxpayers. The Court found, however, that the causal link 
between high taxes in Rochester and Penfield’s zoning practices was 
too speculative. “Whatever may occur in Penfield, the injury 
complained of—increases in taxation—results only from decisions 
made by the appropriate Rochester authorities, who are not parties 
to this case.”221 Likewise, in Milliken v. Bradley,222 the Court held 
that a district court had exceeded its equitable powers in crafting a 
remedy for racial segregation in the Detroit public school system by 
requiring Detroit’s predominantly white suburbs to participate in a 
desegregation plan for the metropolitan area as a whole. The Court 
held that the suburbs bore no responsibility for the predominantly 
black population of the Detroit public school system, which was 
instead the product of “unknown and perhaps unknowable factors 
such as in-migration, birth rates, economic changes, or cumulative 
acts of private racial fears.”223 
 
establish a violation of New Jersey’s equal protection clause, without regard to discriminatory 
intent. The court noted that Mount Laurel’s zoning practices were emblematic of the practices in 
suburban communities throughout New Jersey, which in combination had led to the decline of 
core urban areas. See id. at 717, 723–24. 
 220. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
 221. Id. at 509. 
 222. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 223. Id. at 756 n.2. One notable exception to the Supreme Court’s general trend of seeing 
local governments as autonomous entities is Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69–
70 (1978), in which the Court frankly acknowledged that one municipality’s actions may have 
innumerable impacts on individuals outside the municipality’s borders. Ironically, however, the 
Court reasoned from this premise that states could legitimately limit the franchise to municipal 
residents because it would be administratively impractical to extend the vote to all those affected 
by municipal decision making. See id. Interestingly, the state courts have by and large been much 
more willing than the federal courts to hold local governments accountable for the 
extraterritorial impacts of their land use regulations. In Part III.A.3, I explained that several state 
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2. The public choice model’s fatal flaw 
The Court’s reluctance to recognize that one municipality’s 
actions can have influence beyond its borders is not simply a 
Pollyannaish reaction to the realities of segregation; rather, the 
fiction that the impacts of local land use policies are wholly 
contained within municipal borders is necessary to sustain the entire 
public choice model. The model presupposes that municipalities can 
reliably use their land use powers to protect homeowners’ reliance 
interests in pre-existing property values by, for example, excluding 
new development that may diminish property values. If in reality, 
however, one community could easily externalize the impacts of its 
land use practices onto neighboring communities, that 
presupposition would be completely undermined.224 For example, if 
a municipality approved the siting of a malodorous landfill right near 
the border of an adjacent town so that the offensive smells from the 
landfill would principally afflict homeowners on the other side of the 
border in the adjacent town, then whatever land use policies the 
latter community adopted to protect the property values of those 
unfortunate homeowners would be fruitless. This problem is 
especially likely to appear where there are numerous small 
communities in close proximity to one another, each of which is free 
to adopt land use policies to protect its own homeowners without 
regard to the impact of its policies on neighboring towns. Thus, a 
critical, albeit unstated premise of the public choice model is that 
such external impacts simply do not exist.225 
 
courts have permitted homeowners to sue neighboring towns whose land use decisions affect 
their property values. In some cases, notably New Jersey, this recognition of the broad impacts 
of municipal land use regulation subsequently led the courts to question exclusionary zoning 
practices. See Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 727 (invalidating exclusionary zoning law based on 
regional impact and citing an earlier decision, Borough of Creskill v. Borough of Dumont, 104 A.2d 
441, 445–46 (N.J. 1954), which held that homeowners have standing to challenge zoning 
decisions by neighboring towns). For the most part, though, state courts have not followed the 
decisions regarding standing to sue to their logical conclusion and invalidated exclusionary 
zoning laws.  
 224. See Schragger, supra note 202, at 1831 (local government’s ability to safeguard 
property values may be undermined if there are significant “regional or interlocal spillover 
effects”). 
 225. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory 
Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 969 (1991) (noting that the Tiebout 
model assumes externalities do not exist); Schragger, supra note 202, at 1831 (“Fischel has no 
place in his political economy for interlocal or regional effects.”). 
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There is reason, though, to doubt this premise. As Richard 
Schragger has pointed out in an incisive critique of Fischel, the 
relationship between local government policies and home values is 
not nearly as robust as Fischel claims, largely because home values 
are not entirely determined by local land use decisions but are heavily 
affected by a wide variety of factors outside of local control, 
including land use siting decisions by neighboring communities and 
macroeconomic trends such as the state of the national real estate 
market.226 The recent real estate downturn should be sufficient to 
prove that point—the collapse of risky assets in which major Wall 
Street banks had heavily invested led to a loss of liquidity and 
consumer confidence in the real estate markets that then caused a 
sharp decline in property values across the nation.227 Local zoning 
practices could mount little defense against this powerful, 
destructive force. In short, the entire judicial enterprise to protect 
homeowner reliance interests by empowering small suburbs to 
control their own land use is largely ineffectual because localities 
have only a weak ability to prop up property values. 
CONCLUSION 
If the public choice model is to be believed, we should expect 
Americans by and large to be thrilled with their local governments. 
Under this model, as we have seen, the vast majority of local 
governments are small suburban communities in which 
homeowners—the primary constituency—are able to use their ample 
political influence to ensure that their property values are protected 
through restrictive zoning ordinances. Who would be unhappy with 
a government that gives the people exactly what they want? Yet, 
according to the Saint Index study mentioned in the Introduction, 
more and more Americans are becoming dissatisfied with their local 
governments’ land use policies.228 This suggests that local 
 
 226. Schragger, supra note 202, at 1830–31(“The existence of externalities means that the 
quality or availability of ‘local’ amenities is often beyond the control of a specific local 
government or the homeowners who vote within it.”). 
 227. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 
1177, 1181–85 (2011). 
 228. See The Saint Consulting Group, supra note 2 (stating that fifty-one percent of 
respondents rate local government as “fair to poor” on zoning and planning, and sixty-four 
percent believe land-use approval process is “unfairly” skewed in favor of developers).  
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governments are not giving the people what they want. The real 
estate collapse has made it increasingly obvious that local 
governments cannot cure the inherent volatility of real estate prices, 
and it is this disconnect between the promise of local governments 
to protect homeowners’ property values and their evident inability to 
do so that likely explains homeowner dissatisfaction with local 
governments. 
As we have seen, policymakers and courts have long 
romanticized zoning for stabilizing property values so that 
individuals could purchase homes and acquire a “stake” in the affairs 
of government. Judged by the levels of homeownership in this 
country and the high degree of political activism by homeowners in 
local government, zoning has been a great success. However, it 
should also now be clear that homeowners’ “stake” in local politics 
is quite a mixed blessing. It has led, on one hand, to a political 
system in which it is nearly impossible to reverse the devastating 
impacts of interlocal segregation, and, on the other, to increasing 
cynicism about local government even among its supposed 
beneficiaries. All this has been the price for making homeowners’ 
reliance interests our highest priority, and yet, as just mentioned, it 
is hardly evident that the existing political system does a particularly 
good job at protecting those reliance interests. This impoverished 
model of local government is unworthy of the judicial favor it has so 
long received. 
 
